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COMMENT
Constitutional Law: Vouchers, Sectarian Schools, and
Constitutional Uncertainty: Choices for the United States
Supreme Court and the States
L Introduction
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . ." While the First Amendment applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, states have developed, without violating that constitutional
limit, a variety of approaches to church and state issues.' Some state constitutions
follow the U.S. Constitution, but other states have chosen to follow Virginia in
placing more specific restrictions on state involvement with religion Oklahoma's
constitution is one of the most restrictive.! Article II, section 5 of the Oklahoma
Constitution provides:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied,
donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support
of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion, or for the use,
benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher or dignitary, or sectarian institution as such.5
This Oklahoma provision, on its face, appears to prohibit any aid to sectarian
schools and thus prohibit any voucher program that includes sectarian schools.'
However, constitutional language is open to interpretation. For example, the U.S.
Supreme Court, scholars, and political leaders continue to debate whether the First
Amendment permits some forms of government aid to sectarian schools.7 Even
I. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REv. 73, 76 (1989) (analyzing
how state courts have interpreted state constitutional provisions).
3. See generally Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 EDuc. L. REP.
1 (1997) (discussing the broad range of state constitutional provisions on aid to sectarian institutions and
their relevance to voucher proposals).
4. See id. at 5.
5. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5. A 1995 proposal to change the Oklahoma Constitution to allow the
state to fund private school scholarships failed to pass the Senate. See Heritage Foundation, School
Choice: What's Happening in the States 2000 (visited Oct. 3, 1999) <http.//www.heritage.org/schools/
oklahoma.htm>.
6. In Gurney v. Ferguson, 122 P.2d 1002, 1003 (Okla. 1941), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held
that sectarian schools are sectarian institutions and ruled that aid to sectarian schools was unconstitutional
under article 1I, section 5. However, in other instances the court has taken a more flexible view of
sectarian institutions. See infra Part VIl.A.3 (discussing Oklahoma case law).
7. See LEONARD W. LEvY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FrRsT AMENDMENT
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when the U.S. Supreme Court used the Fourteenth Amendment to apply the
Establishment Clause to the states in Everson v. Board of Education,' the Court
called for separation of church and state and then held that New Jersey could pay
for bus rides for children attending sectarian schools.9
The meaning of state as well as federal constitutional provisions concerning aid
to sectarian institutions is especially important in the debate over school vouchers.
Even in states whose constitutions, like that of Oklahoma, provide specific limits
on state aid to sectarian institutions, courts have allowed some forms of aid."
Therefore, restrictive constitutions do not seem to deter governors and state
legislators who favor aid. For example, Florida has a constitutional provision
limiting state aid to sectarian institutions." Nonetheless, in May 1999, Florida
passed a state-wide publicly funded voucher program for students from poorly per-
forming public schools.
Despite the restrictions in the Oklahoma Constitution, Oklahomans have been
debating various school choice programs, including vouchers, for several years. In
1999, Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating and Fourth District U.S. Representative
J. C. Watts spoke in favor of school vouchers. 3 Also in 1999, Oklahoma became
the thirty-sixth state to approve charter schools, and the Oklahoma Christian
Coalition was leading an effort to have the legislature approve a voucher
program. 4 On the other side, the Oklahoma State School Boards Association
xvi-xvii (2d ed. rev. 1994).
8. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
9. LEvY, supra note 7, at 149-51. Everson is one of several precedents, dating back to at least
1930, that uses the "child benefit" theory. See id. at 152-53. The "child benefit" theory allows aid to go
directly to children (or their parents) and to provide public services that promote the health, safety, or
welfare of the children understate police power. See id. Such services are available regardless of religion
and, according to the "child benefit" theory, aid religion only indirectly. See id. In addition, denying a
general benefit on the basis of religion conflicts with the Free Exercise Clause. See id.
10. In Burkhardt v. City of Enid, 771 P.2d 608, 612 (Okla. 1989), the court held it did not violate
article II, section 5 for a city to buy the campus of a church-related college and lease the campus back
at below market value. See infra notes 448-52 and accompanying text.
11. "No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from
the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid
of any sectarian institution." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
12. See Matthew Miller, A Bold Experiment to Fix City Schools, ATLANTIc MONTHLY, July 1999,
at 15, 16; see also David Byrd, Vouchingfor Vouchers, 31 NA'L J. 1953, 1953 (1999). The Florida plan
offers students in poorly performing schools either a chance to transfer to another public school or an
"opportunity scholarship" to attend a private sectarian or nonsectarian school. Opponents sued, claiming
the plan violated article I, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. See Stanley M. Elam, Why Florida's
Voucher Plan is Unconstitutional, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 1999, at 81, 84 (summarizing the arguments
in the ACLU brief against the Florida plan); Institute for Justice, Florida School Choice Case (visited
Oct. 4, 1999) <http.//www.ij.org/eases/school/florida/florida.shtml>. On March 14,2000, a Floridajudge
declared the plan violated the state constitutional requirement of free public schools. See Ben Wildavsky,
Vouchers Lose in Court: Florida Program is Out, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 27, 2000, at 30, 30.
13. Paul English, Legislature Poisedfor Bow at 'Encore'Session, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 8, 1999,
at 1; Paul Leavitt, Politicians Greet Students with Education Proposals, USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 1999, at
IIA.
14. See Heritage Foundation, supra note 5.
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opposes vouchers. As of March 1999, 160 school boards (slightly less than one-
third of all state school boards) were on record as opposing school vouchers. 5
Before Oklahoma has a full debate over whether to commit substantial time, energy,
and money to any voucher program, it is valuable to look at other states' experien-
ces with voucher programs. In 1998, 1999, and 2000, a series of state and federal
court decisions on school voucher laws in Wisconsin, 6 Maine,'" Vermont, 8
Florida,19 and Ohio demonstrated that these programs raise constitutional
questions that the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet fully addressed.2' Looking
beyond the legal issues, the voucher programs in Wisconsin and Ohio have
sharpened the national debate over whether vouchers are good public policy.
Part II of this comment first examines voucher programs and the practical and
legal issues related to voucher programs. Part III analyzes U.S. Supreme Court
decisions on aid to sectarian schools before 1998 and disputes over the 1997
Agostini v. Feltone decision. Part IV focuses on state school voucher cases,
particularly the 1998 and 1999 post-Agostini decisions. Part V examines the
possible reasons for the range of decisions in those post-Agostini decisions. The
comment then moves in Part VI to a consideration of the choices available to the
U.S. Supreme Court if it accepts voucher cases for review. Part VII analyzes the
policy choices for Oklahoma and the other states, given the uncertainty of current
state and federal law and the nature of voucher programs.
II. Voucher Programs: The Nature of the Problem
A. Types of School Voucher Programs
The modem school voucher movement dates from a 1955 suggestion by Milton
Friedman, who argued that school choice, including school vouchers, would give
parents an alternative to the public schools and that the resulting competition with
15. See Bobby Ross, Jr., City School Board to Discuss Vouchers, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Mar. I,
1999, at 1.
16. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
17. See Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999).
18. See Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999).
19. See Holmes v. Bush, No. 97-3370, 2000 WL 526364 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 14, 2000), rev'd and
remanded, 767 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
20. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999); Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F.
Supp. 2d 725 (N.D. Ohio 1999); Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999), affd
234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000).
21. The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the Wisconsin, Maine, and Vermont cases and
did not accept a voucher case for the 1999-2000 term. In addition, the Court refused to hear the Arizona
Supreme Court's decision upholding tax deductions to foundations supporting sectarian schools. See
Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 283 (1999). The Court did
accept a Louisiana case about public money in sectarian schools which some observers believed could
provide insight into the Court's views on vouchers. See States Can't Subsidize Parochial School Tuition,
NORMAN TRANscRIvr, Dec, 14, 1999, at A9; see infra notes 138-44 and accompanying text
(summarizing ruling in the Louisiana case, Mitchell v. Helms).
22. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
2000]
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private schools would produce better public schools.' Since that time, school choice
programs have grown to include not only vouchers but also privately funded
scholarship programs, tuition tax credits, and charter schools.' Generally, officials
have created these voucher and other choice programs in response to pressure for
alternatives to the perceived failures of the public schools, especially schools in
central cities.'
School vouchers, however, are not new. States have long used voucher programs
to provide public education for small towns that lack the funds or the students
needed to support a public school system.' Maine has had a rural voucher program
since the eighteenth century, and Vermont's program is over one hundred years
old." But no one challenged the Maine and Vermont systems until the states
excluded sectarian schools from their voucher programs.
Government-sponsored voucher programs provide money to parents of qualified
students. In the Vermont and Maine voucher programs, students qualify if their
town has no public school.' In the Milwaukee and Cleveland voucher programs,
students qualify because of economic status or a variety of other factors." Under
Florida's state-wide program, students qualify for vouchers if their public school
fails to meet state standards for two consecutive years." Parents can then use the
voucher to subsidize their children's education at a participating public or private
school?' Thus, some students may use vouchers to attend public schools. 2
23. See Kathy Koch, School Vouchers, CQ RESEARCHER, April 9, 1999, at 290-91; see also Miller,
supra note 12, at 18 (discussing Milton Friedman's goal of minimal government involvement in
education).
24. See John F. Witte, THE MARKET APPROACH TO EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA'S FIRST
VOUCHER PROGRAM 32-33, 44-46, 74-81 (2000) (describing the range of public and private choice
programs in Milwaukee and other cities); Koch, supra note 23, at 283; see also Frontline: The Battle
over School Choice (PBS television broadcast, May 23, 2000) (visited May 27, 2000) <http'J/
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/vouchersf> (providing transcript and web links showing variety
of issues involved).
25. See Miller, supra note 12, at 15-16.
26. These are called "necessary vouchers" and "multidistrict vouchers" in Ellen M. Wasilausky, Jane
Read the Bible: Does the Establishment Clause Allow School Choice Programs to Include Sectarian
Schools After Agostini v. Felton?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 721, 724-25 (1999).
27. See Koch, supra note 23, at 290.
28. See Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 129 (Me. 1999); Chittenden Town Sch. Dist.
v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 544 (Vt. 1999).
29. Such means testing is constitutional because economic status is not a suspect class and education
is not a fundamental right. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
30. See Lynette Clemetson, A Ticket to Private School, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 2000, at 30, 32.
31. Forexample, adjacent public school districts could participate in the Cleveland voucher program.
None did so. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, Nos. 96 APE08-982, APE08-991, 1997 WL217583, at *1-*2
(Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997).
32. See Sorting Out School Choice, ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 1999, at 33, 34 (describing the Arizona
voucher plan where students choose between traditional and charter public schools). Public charter
schools are funded by tax money but are encouraged to experiment with different approaches to
education by being freed from many state regulations on hiring and curriculum. See id.; see also Koch
supra note 23, at 283.
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Voucher programs that allow students to use the vouchers at private schools may
include or exclude sectarian schools.33 As noted earlier, Maine and Vermont
include nonsectarian private schools but specifically exclude sectarian schools.
Other programs, such as those in Ohio and Wisconsin, include all public and private
(both sectarian and nonsectarian) schools that qualify to participate.'
Voucher programs may be publicly or privately funded.' They can be targeted
voucher programs, designed to help particular populations such as the urban poor
attending underfunded public schools, or universal voucher programs, available to
all students regardless of their income levels or the quality of their public schools.'
Some supporters of voucher programs targeted at the urban poor express concern
that targeted programs could expand to universal programs and believe that
universal vouchers may undermine support for the public schools and create
expensive, politically irreversible middle class entitlement programs.37 Other
targeted voucher supporters either believe the value of choice outweighs the risks
of universal vouchers' or see universal vouchers as the ultimate goal.39 For all
voucher programs, issues of cost and effectiveness are important."
B. School Financing Issues
State rules for public school financing vary, but most school funds are tied, at
least in part, to the average daily attendance 1 In Oklahoma, for example, in the
1992-93 school year, the state general fund provided 69.9% of school funding.42
The allocation for each district was based on the weighted average daily atten-
dance. '3 Local governments provided 23.1% of the funding, and the remaining
7.0% came from the federal government.'
Local funding is usually based on the property tax, leading to better schools and
lower tax rates in the wealthier districts.!5 Frustration with this inequality led to
several court challenges claiming that local funding calculations denied the poor
equal protection.m " In one of these cases, San Antonio Independent School District
33. See Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REv. 807,
837 (1999) (describing the different types of voucher systems).
34. See infra Part IV (discussing voucher cases).
35. See Kim K. Metcalf & Polly A. Tait, Free Market Policies and Public Education: What Is the
Cost of Choice?, PHi DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 1999, at 65, 66.
36. See Witte, supra note 24, at 196-97.
37. See it. at 190; infra notes 386-401 and accompanying text (discussing these concerns).
38. See Metcalf & Tait, supra note 35, at 74.
39. See Witte, supra note 24, at 184-85.
40. See infra Part VII.A.1 (discussing policy concerns).
41. See, e.g., 70 OKLA. STAT. § 615 (Supp. 2000); id. § 18-200.1; 70 OKLA. STAT. § 10-103.1 (1991).
42. See OKLAHOMA ALMANAC 711-12 (45th ed. rev. 1995).
43. See id. The weighted average daily attendance is called the weighted average daily membership
and is calculated according to a formula designed to protect schools against sudden shifts in funding.
See id. at 712; see also 70 OKLA. STAT. § 18-200.1. Local funding is tied to annual millage levies. See
OKLAHOMA ALMANAC, supra note 42, at 712; see also 70 OKLA. STAT. § 5-134 (Supp. 2000).
44. See OKLAHOMA ALMANAC, supra note 42, at 711.
45. See Miller, supra note 12, at 17-18.
46. See id. at 18.
2000]
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v. Rodriguez,47 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected arguments that-funding based on
property taxes denied students a constitutional right to equal educational oppor-
tunities. The Court held that Texas's property-based school funding did not violate
the U.S. Constitution because the poor are not a suspect class and education is not
a fundamental constitutional right.O
Despite Rodriguez, further litigation and political pressures at the state level
caused Texas and several other states to modify their school funding systems.49
Nonetheless, some supporters of school funding equity litigation turned to
educational vouchers as another approach to equalizing educational opportunities."
Using vouchers, children from poorer families could either bring more money to
their local public schools or transfer from poorly performing schools to better
schools.'
In voucher programs, all or part of this per pupil expenditure moves with the
child to the new school, whether it is another public school, a public charter school,
or a private school.' Urban voucher programs, which attract large numbers of
students, thus can significantly cut the money going to public school districts. For
example, the Milwaukee program began in 1990 with 337 students, taking $733,000
from the public schools.53 By 1998-99, there were 5830 students participating,
diverting $28 million from the public schools to private schools participating in the
voucher program.
An additional funding issue is accountability for the use of funds. While public
support for voucher programs had grown to a slight majority in 1998, in one poll
74% said there needed to be accountability.55 However, accountability would
involve state assessment of school programs, and only eighteen percent of private
religious schools said they were "definitely willing" to participate in voucher
programs that involved state assessment.'
Assessment and other accountability measures are controversial. For example,
some analyses of student achievement in Milwaukee and Cleveland found significant
improvement, while others have found none.' In addition, accountability for public
47. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
48. See icL at 25.
49. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 754 (Kcrmit
L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
50. See Miller, supra note 12, at 18.
51. See id.
52. See Koch, supra note 23, at 293.
53. See id at 292-93.
54. See id. The amount per pupil rose from $2446 in 1990-91 to $4894 in 1998-99. See id.
55. See id. at 283; see also Clemnetson, supra note 30, at 32 (noting problems resulting from lack
of accountability in schools receiving voucher funds); Editorial, Folks Favor Public Schools, OKLA.
OBSERVER, Sept. 25, 1999, at 5 (reporting that 77% want accountability if public funds are used in
private schools).
56. See Koch, supra note 23, at 289.
57. See Eric Hirsh & Shelby Samuelson, Turning Away from Public Education, STATE LEOIs-
LATURES, Sept. 1999, at 12, 15-16; Koch, supra note 23, at 298-99; see also infra Part VI (discussing
policy considerations); American Federation of Teachers (visited Oct. 4, 1999)
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funds going to sectarian schools has included the restriction that no public money
be spent on religious activities.s The U.S. Supreme Court has often ruled that such
financial accounting violates the First Amendment because detailed state auditing
produces excessive entanglement of church and state." Thus, financing issues
blend into constitutional issues.
C. Constitutional Issues
Voucher programs that include or exclude sectarian schools raise several
constitutional issues.' Not all voucher programs include sectarian schools."'
However, 77.1% of private schools are sectarian,' so excluding sectarian schools
limits the impact of vouchers. If sectarian schools are excluded, parents wanting
sectarian schools may claim these programs violate both the Free Exercise and
Equal Protection Clauses.' If sectarian schools are included, voucher opponents
challenge the programs as a violation of the Establishment Clause or of state
constitutional provisions against aid to religion.'
In addition, voucher opponents raise Equal Protection issues. Sectarian schools
usually have lower tuition than the nonsectarian private schools, so voucher money
covers a larger percentage of the tuition at sectarian schools.' Also, private
schools in low-income neighborhoods are usually sectarian.' Either because of cost
or location or both, voucher opponents note that poorer families with vouchers
choose sectarian schools.67 The NAACP has claimed that this has the effect of
segregating the private schools, with racial minorities concentrated in the sectarian
schools." Thus, the NAACP argues that tax-funded vouchers promote segregation
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.'
<http.//www.aft.org/research/vouchers> (discussing and critiquing the competing studies).
58. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 230-31 (1977) (allowing aid for textbooks and for
testing, diagnostic, and remedial services, but not for instructional equipment and field trips); see aLso
infra note 138 (noting Mitchell v. Helms overruled Wolman).
59. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971).
60. See Hamilton, supra note 33, at 837 (noting the issues associated with each type of program).
Only the use of public voucher money in public schools does not raise constitutional issues. See id.
61. For example, the Milwaukee program initially excluded sectarian schools. See Jackson v.
Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Wis. 1998).
62. See Koch, supra note 23, at 284.
63. See, e.g., Bagley v. Raymond School Dep't, 728 A.2d. 127 (Me. 1999).
64. See Witte, supra note 24, at 21-23; see also, e.g., Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203
(Ohio 1999).
65. Churches usually subsidize sectarian schools, either by cash subsidies or by allowing the schools
to use church buildings at reduced or no cost. See Koch, supra note 23, at 289.
66. See id.
67. See i& at 284, 289.
68. See id. at 284; Evan Thomas & Lynette Clementson, A New War over Vouchers, NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 22, 1999, at 46, 46.
69. The Jackson court rejected this argument. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 630-32
(Wis. 1998). The African-American community is divided over whether the NAACP should pursue this
argument. See Koch, supra note 23, at 284.
20001
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Il1. Aid to Sectarian Schools: The Relevant Law Before 1998
A. The Lemon Test
In Lemon v. Kurtzman," the U.S. Supreme Court formulated a three-part test
for determining whether state aid to sectarian schools violates the First and
Fourteenth Amendments: "[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion.'' However, even the U.S. Supreme Court has had
trouble applying the Lemon test,' and several Justices have expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the test. 3
B. From Lemon to Agostini
Applying Lemon, the U.S. Supreme Court held unconstitutional in Committee for
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,74 a New York program that
provided cash for maintenance and equipment to nonpublic schools serving low-
income families. The program also provided a partial tuition reimbursement to low
income parents of students in nonpublic schools and a tax deduction for other
parents of nonpublic school students.' The Nyquist Court determined that the
program had a secular purpose.76 However, the Court found that all three
provisions of the program impermissibly advanced religion." Because there were
no restrictions on the use of the direct maintenance, repair, and equipment grants
to subsidize only secular activities, the Court found that the "primary effect" was
to "advance religion."78 The tuition reimbursements and tax deductions, even
though the assistance went through the parents, also failed.' The Court deter-
mined that the tax money provided an incentive to parents to send their children
to sectarian schools."' There was no assurance that tax-subsidized tuition
payments would be used only for secular education."'
The Court particularly noted that these tuition subsidies are not available to
parents of public school students and suggested that the holding might be different
in a case in which the aid was "made available generally without regard to the
sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefitted.""'
70. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
71. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
72. See LEvy, supra note 7, at 158.
73. See id. at 161; see also Suzanne H. Bauknight, The Search for Constitutional School Choice,
27 J.L & EDUC. 525, 536 (1998).
74. 413 U.S. 756, 762, 798 (1973).
75. See id. at 764-69.
76. See id. at 773.
77. See id. at 794.
78. Id. at 774.
79. See id. at 785-86.
80. See id. at 786.
81. See id. at 780.
82. Id at 782 n.38.
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The Court pointed out that "neutral, nonideological aid, assisting only the secular
functions of sectarian schools" and having only "an indirect and incidental effect
beneficial to religious institutions" was permissible." However, "assistance of the
sort here involved carries grave potential for entanglement in the broader sense of
continuing political strife over aid to religion. ' " Even though the Nyquist Court
ruled against the tuition-aid program, voucher supporters point out that the opinion
also suggests neutral and indirect aid programs available to all students would be
acceptable."
From the Nyquist decision in 1972 until 1986, the Court attempted to clarify
what types of state and federal aid to sectarian schools were permissible. In Meek
v. Pittenger,' the Court found that state loans of textbooks were permissible, but
not loans of instructional equipment that could be used for religious purposes."
In Mueller v. Allen," the Court approved tax deductions for tuition, textbooks,
and transportation because the deductions went to all parents, not just parents of
nonpublic school students. The parents chose where to spend the money, and the
deduction was only one of many available to taxpayers. Therefore, even though
most of the money indirectly benefitted sectarian schools, the Court did not find
a violation of the Establishment Clause." However, in Aguilar v. Felton,' the
Court held that the state could not provide remedial instruction to children in
sectarian schools inside the school building.9'
In 1986, Chief Justice Warren Burger retired and William Rehnquist became
Chief Justice.' As an Associate Justice, Rehnquist had often objected to the
Lemon test and was on record as supporting a "nonpreferentialist," rather than a
"separation of church and state," interpretation of the First Amendment. 3 In
addition to Chief Justice Burger, Associate Justices Powell, Brennan, and Marshall
also retired during the Reagan and Bush presidencies. Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Souter joined the Court.'
Because of the conservative Christian support for Reagan and Bush, these new
Justices were expected to be more conservative on issues important to those
83. Id at 775.
84. Il at 794.
85. See Mark E. Chopko, Vouchers Can Be Constitutional, 31 CONN. L. REv. 945, 957 (1999).
86. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
87. See id. at 362-63; see aLvo infra note 138 (noting Mitchell v. Helms overturned Meek).
88. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
89. See CHOPKO, supra note 85, at 958.
90. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
91. See id. at 414.
92. See JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST
COURT 8-9 (1995).
93. See id. at 238-39.
94. During the Clinton presidency, Associate Justices Blackmun and White retired, and Associate
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer took their places. See id. at 297-302.
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voters. 5 In particular, U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Witters v. Washington,"
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,' and Agostini v. Felton9 have led
many observers to conclude that the Court has become so receptive to aid for
sectarian primary and secondary schools that it would accept a carefully structured
voucher program." Others believe these cases must be read more narrowly."m
For example, in Witters, a unanimous Court held that when a blind student
receives state vocational rehabilitation assistance, the use of that aid to attend a
private Christian college to study for the ministry does not violate the Establish-
ment Clause.'' Applying the Lemon test, the Court determined that rehabilitation
of the visually impaired was a secular purpose.'" ' The Court reasoned that "the
mere circumstance that petitioner has chosen to use neutrally available state aid to
help pay for his religious education [does not] confer any message of state
endorsement of religion."' ' The aid went directly to the recipient and "[a]ny aid
provided under Washington's program that ultimately flows to religious institutions
does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid
recipients."'' Witters thus approves aid that is generally available to qualified
students. However, the aid in question in Witters was for college students who
rarely used the aid at religious schools. The Court has long been more receptive
to programs that aid sectarian colleges." ' On remand, the Washington Supreme
Court found the program invalid because it violated the Washington
Constitution."
In Zobrest, the Court held that a state-provided sign language interpreter for a
student in a sectarian high school does not violate the Establishment Clause."
As in Witters, the Court determined that the aid was available to those who
qualified and that the aid went to the student, not to the school."9 ' In addition,
the aid was the same whether the student attended a public or a nonpublic
school.'" Although earlier decisions had barred state-supported teachers in the
95. See id. at 237. Simon concludes such expectations have not always been accurate. See id. at
287-90.
96. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
97. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
98. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
99. See CHOPKO, supra note 85, at 960-63.
100. See HAMILTON, supra note 33, at 839.
101. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488-89.
102. See id. at 485-86.
103. Id. at 488-89.
104. Id. at 488.
105. See Alan E. Brownstein, Evaluating School Voucher Programs through a Liberty, Equality,
and Free Speech Matrix, 31 CONN. L. REV. 871, 934-37 (1999).
106. See Kemerer, supra note 3, at 19-20; Witte, supra note 24, at 22.
107. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Seh. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1993).
108. See iii at 13.
109. See id. at 10.
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sectarian schools, the Zobrest court said that "the Establishment Clause lays down
no absolute bar to the placing of a public employee in a sectarian school.""0
C. Agostini and Its Aftermath
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned Aguilar in Agostini v. Felton". and held
"that a federally funded program providing supplemental, remedial instruction to
disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is not invalid under the Establishment
Clause when such instruction is given on the premises of sectarian schools by
government employees" who are monitored for religious neutrality in monthly
visits."' In Agostini, Justice O'Connor stressed that "the general principles we use
to evaluate whether government aid violates the Establishment Clause have not
changed since Aguilar was decided." '
Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor noted two changes as a result of Witters and
Zobrest." First, the Court "[has] abandoned the presumption . . . that the
placement of public employees on parochial school grounds inevitably results in.
. . state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between
government and religion.""' Second, the Court no longer believes "that all
government aid that directly assists the educational function of religious schools is
invalid."".6 However, the Court majority did not abandon the Lemon test."7
Justice O'Connor emphasized that the Court continues to ask "whether the
government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion" and
"whether the aid has the 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion.... She merged
"entanglement" with "effect" because entanglement and effect are judged by the
same factors: "the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefitted, the
nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and religious authority.""..9
The four Agostini dissenters countered that the majority had misinterpreted
Zobrest.a Supporting their viewpoint, Alan E. Brownstein argues that Witers,
Zobrest, and Agostini represent the Court's commitment to an "ad hoc, case-by-case
analysis.'' Thus, he concludes that it is wrong to read these cases as broad
statements of support for voucher programs.'"
110. Id. at 13.
111. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
112. Id. at 234-35.
113. Id. at 222.
114. See id. at 223.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 225.
117. Agostini was a 5-4 decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas were in the majority, while Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented.
118. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-23.
119. Id. at 232 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971)).
120. See id. at 248-50.
121. BROWNSTEIN, supra note 105, at 942.
122. See id.
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Still, most analyses of Agostini conclude that the decision marks a significant
shift in the Court's view of the Establishment Clause.'" These analyses find that
Agostini has abandoned the "entanglement" test because Justice O'Connor states that
"the factors we use to assess whether an entanglement is 'excessive' are similar to
the factors we use to examine 'effect.""'  Justice O'Connor also states that the
criteria the Court uses to decide "whether government aid has the effect of
advancing religion" are whether the funded program "result[s] in governmental
indoctrination; define[s] its recipients by . . . religion; or create[s] an excessive
entanglement.""I Since most programs of aid have fallen because of the "Catch-
22" between the second and third prongs," elimination of the entanglement prong
should make it easier for aid programs, including vouchers, to win court ap-
proval.'"
There are alternative interpretations of Agostini's significance. First, it can be
argued that the Aguilar Court erred on both the facts and the precedents. The
Court's majority opinion ignored the fact that New York had created many
safeguards to ensure the public school teachers who provided the remedial
instruction were only accountable to public school officials." Thus, Edwin G.
West and Leonard W. Levy find no evidence to support Brennan's contention in
Aguilar that the program entangled church and state." While Justice O'Connor's
Agostini opinion states that Aguilar is "no longer good law,"'30 her Aguilar dissent
demonstrates that she did not believe Aguilar was good law in 1985 either.' In
addition, Aguilar and Agostini both involved a federal Title I program that offered
123. See Jeremy T. Bunnow, Reinventing the Lemon: Agostini v. Felton and the Changing Nature
of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 1998 WiS. L. REV. 1133, 1178-80 (1998) (finding that the Court
has taken an activist, accomodationist position that allows more direct state aid to parochial schools); see
also Kimberly M. DeShano, Educational Vouchers and the Religion Clauses Under Agostini:
Resurrection, Insurrection and a New Direction, 49 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 747,756 (1999) (finding that
Agostini has weakened the Lemon test and virtually eliminated the entanglement prong); Gary N. Mozer,
The Crumbling Wall Between Church and State: Agostini v. Felton, Aid to Parochial Schools, and the
Establishment Clause in the Twenty-First Century, 31 CONN. L. REv. 337, 339 (1998) (finding that the
decision is "a significant rejection of the separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause").
124. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232.
125. Id at 234.
126. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420-21 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (calling the
conflict between the two prongs a "Catch-22").
127. See Bauknight, supra note 73, at 540, 549-50.
128. See LEvy, supra note 7, at 175-76. The safeguards included a prohibition against religious
symbols in the rooms and monitoring by city officials. In addition, the public school teachers involved
in the program used secular materials, did the testing themselves, did not participate in religious
activities, and did not teach with the parochial school teachers. See id.
129. See id. at 177; see also Edwin G. West, Constitutional Judgment on Non-Public School Aid:
Fresh Guidelines or New Roadblocks, 35 EMoRY LJ. 795, 803 (1986) (stating there was no evidence
of proselytizing in the publicly funded remedial classes challenged in Aguilar).
130. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 236.
131. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 428 (O'Connor &Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (noting that "not a single
incident of religious indoctrination has been identified ... over the past two decades," is evidence that
public school teachers continue to act like public school teachers even inside a parochial school).
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supplemental aid to provide help to "educationally deprived" students.' The
program benefits the students directly and the school only indirectly, and thus fits
into the "child benefit" test, which the Court has used since the 1930s to allow
indirect aid to sectarian schools.'33
Second, assuming the Aguilar Court was correct in 1985, it can still be argued
that the experience with the Aguilar decision showed it did not work in practice.
New York set up mobile classrooms so the children could get remedial instruction
outside the parochial school building." As Justice O'Connor stressed in Agostini,
the subsidy exists whether the program is inside or outside the building.'35 Thus,
Marci A. Hamilton concludes that the Agostini Court was simply correcting a
decision that had produced an absurd result.'36
Third, Agostini is not a clear decision. Some of its language suggests that the
Court is much more open to direct aid to sectarian schools, but the holding is
narrow: it applies to federal funds used to provide disadvantaged children with
remedial instruction by government employees.'37 In fact, Mitchell v. Helms,''
decided June 28, 2000, demonstrates that U.S. Supreme Court Justices are divided
on how to interpret and apply Agostini. Justice Thomas, writing for a plurality of
four,' cited Agostini as evidence that "aid that is offered to a broad range of
groups of persons without regard to religion" is neutral and therefore
constitutional." However, Justice O'Connor'" disagreed with the plurality's view
of Agostini, stating that "the Court has never held that a government-aid program
passes constitutional muster solely because of the neutral criteria it employs as a
basis for distributing aid.""I Justice O'Connor concluded that Agostini controlled
Mitchell simply because the facts in the cases were so similar.43
Thus, Mitchell shows that the Court remains divided over the constitutionality of
government aid to sectarian schools and the significance of Agostini.'" Until the
132. See LEVY, supra note 7, at 175.
133. See id. at 168.
134. See Hamilton, supra note 33, at 834.
135. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230.
136. See Hamilton, supra note 33, at 834.
137. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234-35.
138. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000) (ruling 6-3 that using federal funds to provide books, computers, and
other instructional equipment to public, religious, and other private schools does not violate the First
Amendment). The six Justices overruled Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) and Wolnan v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977) as inconsistent with Mitchell. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2555; see aLvo Stuart
Taylor Jr., The War Over the Court, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 2000, at 18, 21.
139. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy.
140. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2541.
141. Concurring in the result for herself and Justice Breyer.
142. Id. at 2534.
143. Both programs were authorized by the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981,
neither provided funds directly to sectarian schools, neither supported the regular program of sectarian
schools, and neither supported religious indoctrination. See id. at 2562-64.
144. Justice Souter's dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, reviews the cases involving
government aid to sectarian schools and analyzes the principles and factors involved. See id. at 2572-97.
Justice O'Connor agreed with the dissenters that there is no single test for constitutionality of government
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Court takes and decides a voucher case, Agostini's impact on the voucher issue
remains open to speculation. The cases on state voucher programs since Agostini
demonstrate that state and lower federal courts also disagree over how to interpret
and apply Agostini.
IV. State School Voucher Cases: Confusion in the Lower Courts
In 1998, 1999, and 2000, state and federal courts decided cases involving
vouchers. A school voucher case in Florida was decided solely on state
constitutional grounds." In Vermont and Maine, cases arose out of challenges to
the exclusion of sectarian schools." On the other hand, cases in Florida, Wiscon-
sin, and Ohio involved challenges to the inclusion of sectarian schools.' The
Vermont and Maine plans focus on rural areas, while the Wisconsin and Ohio plans
reflect concerns about the failure of urban school systems. Some of the issues
examined in these cases are unique to each state. However, with the exception of
the Florida case, court reasoning in all these cases analyzes the same U.S. Supreme
Court decisions and the same federal constitutional issues.
One reason for this similarity is the interest group involvement in these cases.
Since the 1970s, both liberal and conservative groups have sought to influence court
policy. Interest groups do not lobby courts directly, but indirectly they can and do
influence courts to promote or protect their interests. Some groups have established
public interest law firms. Groups may initiate litigation or offer support to a party
already in litigation. In addition, groups may submit amicus curiae briefs to
supplement the arguments of one side in existing litigation."" Supporting or
opposing judicial nominees is another group activity. 4" Groups hope such
activities either increase the chance a court will adopt a policy favored by the group
or at least not adopt a policy that the group opposes.'" From the 1940s through
the 1960s, the NAACP and the ACLU were quite successful at the Supreme Court
level. Since the 1970s, the federal courts have been more sympathetic to conser-
vative groups such as the American Center for Law and Justice."'
Groups and public interest law firms appearing in support of voucher programs
include the Institute for Justice (Ohio, Wisconsin, Vermont, and Florida cases),
American Center for Law and Justice (both Maine cases) and Becket Center for
aid to sectarian schools and that even if the funds are distributed in an even-handed manner, the aid will
be unconstitutional if the aid is diverted to promote religion or is perceived as a government promotion
of religion. See id. at 2557, 2559.
145. See Holmes v. Bush, No. 97-3370 2000 WL 526364, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 14, 2000)
(finding Florida's Scholarship Opportunity Plan violated Article IX, section 1 of the Florida Constitution
requiring Florida to provide free public education), rev'd and remanded, 767 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000).
146. See infra Parts IV.A., IV.D.
147. See infra Parts IV.B., IV.C.
148. See LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY 277 (4th ed. 1998).
149. See id. at 276.
150. See id. at 278.
151. See id. at 278-81.
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Religious Liberty (Ohio and Vermont). The ACLU appeared against vouchers in all
the cases, as did Americans United for Separation of Church and State.1' When
the same interest groups help parties in several different cases, it is not surprising
that the same arguments recur. These cases demonstrate the broad range of interest
groups involved in the school voucher issue and how essential group assistance can
be to a party. For example, Pat Robertson's American Center for Law and Justice
provided legal assistance to parents who wanted Maine to pay their children's tuition
to attend a sectarian high school.'" On the other side, Americans United for
Separation of Church and State provides help to challengers of vouchers."
A. The Maine Multidistrict Transfer Voucher Program
Since 1981, Maine has excluded sectarian schools from its voucher program.
Parents who enrolled their children in sectarian schools and who wanted the state
to pay the tuition brought suit in federal and state court, claiming violation of the
Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the
Due Process Clause, and the Free Speech Clause.55 In a very brief opinion in a
1998 case, the U.S. District Court in Maine held that the First Amendment does not
require Maine to include sectarian schools in its voucher program."
In 1999, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reached the same conclusion in
Bagley v. Raymond School Department.' The Bagley court held that "Maine's
tuition program does not violate the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses of the
First Amendment or the Equal Protection mandates of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'" The court examined U.S. Supreme Court decisions through
Agostini and concluded that direct grants to religious schools that support, rather
than supplement, the school's regular program do violate the Establishment
Clause.'59 Since the Maine tuition program provides direct grants to support the
school's regular program, the court determined Maine's reason for excluding
religious schools from the program was consistent with the Establishment
Clause."m
The Maine parents who lost in federal district court appealed. After the Bagley
decision, on May 27, 1999, the First Circuit affirmed the Maine federal district
court in Strout v. Albanese.' The First Circuit rejected the Establishment claim
152. See, e.g., Witte, supra note 24, at 177-78 (discussing group involvement in the Milwaukee
school voucher cases).
153. See Steve Benen, Upholding the Wall, CHURcH & STATE, July/Aug. 1999, at 16. For a second
example, see the Institute for Justice homepage, which includes a list of the cases they have argued or
supported, with "victory" flags by the Milwaukee and Arizona cases (visited Oct. 3, 1999)
<http'J/www.ij.org/cases/index.html>.
154. See Benen, supra note 153.
155. See Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 59 (Ist Cir. 1999).
156. See Strout v. Commissioner, 13 F. Supp. 2d 112, 113-14 (D. Me. 1998).
157. 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999).
158. lad at 147.
159. See id. at 140-42.
160. See id. at 143-47.
161. 178 F.3d 57, 66 (lst Cir. 1999).
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for five reasons. First, the court found "the somewhat inscrutable guidelines of the
Supreme Court" offered "no binding authority" that direct tuition payments to
sectarian schools are constitutional." Second, the court stated that the Framers
meant the Establishment Clause to prevent the entanglement of church and state."
Third, the court concluded that, while U.S. Supreme Court decisions do allow some
targeted funding of programs in religious schools, those decisions do not permit
"broad sponsorship of religious schools."'" Fourth, the First Circuit determined
that "approving direct payments of tuition by the state to sectarian schools
represents a quantum leap ... best left for the Supreme Court to undertake."""ss
Fifth, the court noted that the Establishment Clause is a limit on government action
and cannot be used to create an individual entitlement to state funds.'6
Relying heavily on the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's Bagley decision, the First
Circuit noted that, even if there were an Equal Protection problem, Maine's need to
avoid violating the Establishment Clause is a compelling reason for restricting the
use of the funds.'" The court then rejected the Free Exercise claim for four
reasons. First, some appellants chose St. Dominic's, a Catholic school, for academic,
not religious, reasons.' Second, although they could not use voucher money, the
parents were free to choose St. Dominic's for their children."' Third, the state was
not interfering with the parents' freedom of religion because parochial school
education is not a church-mandated belief or practice.'" Fourth, there was no
evidence that religious prejudice motivated the Maine legislature.' The court then
dismissed the free speech and due process claims, finding no support for the
argument that the parental right to choose their children's education entitled them
to funding to achieve that right." The American Center for Law and Justice
supported an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court." However, on October 12, 1999,
the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari."
162. Id at 60-61.
163: See id at 61.
164. IdL at 62.
165. Id. at64.
166. See id. at 64.
167. See id at 64-65. In his concurrence, Judge Levin H. Campbell stated that since the Free
Exercise claim failed, the statute did not violate a fundamental right. See id. at 67. Therefore, the Equal
Protection Clause only required the Maine legislature to have a rational basis for its choice, which the
Attorney General had provided. See idt He saw no need to examine the Establishment Clause claim, See
id. at 68. However, he noted that this would change if the Supreme Court decided that direct tuition
payments were constitutional and that "[a] strong argument can be made to that effect." Id. (Campbell,
J., concurring).
168. See id. at 65.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 66.
173. See Benen, supra note 153, at 16.
174. See Strout v. Albanese, 120 S. Ct. 329 (1999).
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B. The Wisconsin Voucher Program
Wisconsin's voucher program, which focuses on resolving problems in urban
schools, began in Milwaukee in 1990."75 The legislature limited participation to
students whose family income did not exceed 175% of the official poverty rate.'
76
The state aid of approximately $2500 per student was deducted from the Milwaukee
public school system and given directly to participating, nonsectarian private
schools." The schools had to comply with state nondiscrimination laws, submit
annual reports, and permit extensive evaluation and financial audits.7" The initial
1990-91 enrollment of 341 students in these private schools increased to 830
students by 1994-95."
In 1995, the state legislature expanded the program to include sectarian schools
if students could opt out of the religious activities. In addition, the money was sent
to the schools in the name of the parents, and the amount (approximately $4400 per
student in 1996-97) was limited to the lesser of the Milwaukee state aid per pupil
or the cost of the private school. The legislature dropped the financial and
performance audits."' Facing a constitutional challenge to the expanded program,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court deadlocked on whether to remove an injunction
against the program.' Both the trial and appeals courts found the program
unconstitutional." However, by 1998 the balance on the Wisconsin Supreme
Court had shifted: a pro-voucher judge had replaced an anti-voucher judge."'
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, voting four to two, held that the
expanded Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) did not violate either the
Wisconsin Constitution or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment."'
The court's Establishment Clause analysis applied the Lemon test. First, the court
concluded that the program had a secular purpose: helping low income parents send
their children to private schools.'" Second, the court analyzed U.S. Supreme Court
decisions through Agostini and concluded
that state educational assistance programs do not have the primary effect
of advancing religion if those programs provide public aid to both
175. See Witte, supra note 24, at 36-44; Ted C. Olsen, Voucher Victory: School-Choice Advocates
Win in Wisconsin, But Can the Movement Gain Momentum? CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Sept. 7, 1998, at 72-
73.
176. See Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407, 411-12 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
177. See id. at 412.
178. See id.
179. See Witte, supra note 24, at 55. Participation was capped at 1%-1.5% of the Milwaukee Public
School System enrollment, 1450 in 1994-95, but there were not enough seats in the nonsectarian schools
to reach that maximum. See id. at 55-56.
180. See Jackson, 570 N.W.2d at 412-13.
181. See Olsen, supra note 175, at 73.
182. See Jackson, 570 N.W.2d at 427.
183. See Olsen, supra note 175, at 73,
184. See Jackson v. Benson, 578'N.W.2d 602,632 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
185. See id. at 612.
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sectarian and nonsectarian institutions (1) on the basis of neutral, secular
criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion; and (2) only as a result
of numerous private choices of the individual parents of school-age
children."M
Third, the court concluded that there was no excessive entanglement because there
was no increased state supervision of private schools participating in the
program.
187
Supporters and opponents of voucher programs saw the Wisconsin case as a
chance for the U.S. Supreme Court to take a position on vouchers. ' However,
the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on November 9, 1998.'"'
C. The Ohio Voucher Programs
1. Simmons-Harris v. Goff
In 1995, the U.S. District Court supervising implementation of Reed v. Rhodes'
determined the crisis in the Cleveland, Ohio, schools was so serious that direct state
management was necessary.'" The Ohio legislature created both a tutorial program
and a voucher program for Cleveland." In the voucher or Pilot Scholarship
Program recipients (chosen by lot) could attend either private schools in the
Cleveland school district or public schools in adjacent districts.' 3 If the family
income exceeded 200% of the poverty level, students could receive up to 75% of
tuition." If the family income did not exceed 200% of the poverty level, students
could receive 90% of tuition. 5 However, in either case, the maximum grant in
1995 was $2500.'" If the family chose a public school, the check went directly
to the school.'" If the family chose a private school, the check bearing the names
186. Id. at 617.
187. See id. at 619-20.
188. See Steve France, A New Test for Lemon: Will the Courts Give Passing Grade to School
Vouchers?, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1998, at 30, 30-31.
189. See Jackson v. Benson, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).
190. 869 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
191. See Reed v. Rhodes, I F. Supp. 2d 705, 710 (N.D. Ohio 1998). The Reed v. Rhodes litigation
began in 1976. See Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ohio 1976). In 1994, the Cleveland Board
of Education agreed to a Consent Decree aimed at integrating the public schools and improving the
quality of education. See Reed, 869 F. Supp. at 1276. The required tax levy did not pass, and the
financial situation was desperate. See Reed, I F. Supp. 2d at 710. In 1995, the court directed the State
Superintendent to take over and run the system to fulfill the Consent Decree. See id. The 1998 Reed
court determined that the schools had demonstrated good faith in their efforts to end segregation;
therefore, the court terminated federal court supervision. See Judge Ends Supervision of SchooLv in
Cleveland, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1998, at A26.
192. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, Nos. 96-APE08-982, 96 APE08-991, 1997 WL 217583, at *1
(Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997).
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
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of the parents or guardians went to the school."'a The parents or guardians then
endorsed the check to the school. '"
Opponents challenged the voucher program in state court, claiming it violated
both the Ohio and U.S. Constitutions. Although the Goff trial court held in 1996
that the voucher program violated neither the Ohio nor the U.S. Constitutions, the
Court of Appeals of Ohio in 1997 found that the program was "not facially neutral"
because it "create[d] an impermissible incentive for parents to send their children
to sectarian schools."' Since no public schools participated in the program, the
result was "direct and substantial, nonneutral government aid to sectarian schools"
that had "the primary effect of advancing religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause.""'
In 1999, in Simmons-Harris v. Goff,' the Supreme Court of Ohio, relying
heavily on Agostini, reversed the Ohio Court of Appeals.' The Supreme Court
of Ohio held that the voucher program did not violate the Establishment Clause for
three reasons. First, there was no evidence that Ohio was helping sectarian schools
indoctrinate students.' Second, with one exception, which the court severed from
the statute, allocation of the money did not define beneficiaries by religion. 5
Third, there was no entanglement of church and state because the money went to
the parents for the benefit of the children and not to the school, and because state
supervision was minimal.' However, the court held that the program violated the
Ohio Constitution because the legislature created the program in a general
appropriations bill.' Since there were independent state grounds for the decision,
a U.S. Supreme Court review would not have been appropriate.
2. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman
On June 29, 1999, the Ohio legislature corrected the state constitutional
deficiencies and passed the voucher program again.' In July, opponents filed suit
in the U.S. District Court in the Northern District of Ohio, claiming the revised
program violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. On
August 13, the court heard arguments in Simmons-Harris v. Zelman on whether
to grant a preliminary injunction. On August 25, the court held that because the
plaintiffs had "a very substantial chance of succeeding on the merits" and "there is
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. Id. at *9.
201. Id. at *10.
202. 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999).
203. See id at 211.
204. See id. at 209.
205. See id. at 210.
206. See id. at211.
207. See id. at 216.
208. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
209. 54 F. Supp. 2d 725 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
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a substantial likelihood that they will suffer irreparable harm," "it is substantially in
the public interest to grant an injunction. '"220
In its reasoning, the court determined that the Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program
probably violated the Establishment Clause for three reasons. First, the court found
that, like the parents in Nyquist, nearly all the Cleveland parents were sending their
children to sectarian schools and that Nyquist, which held that states cannot provide
unrestricted grants to parents who send their children to sectarian schools, controlled
the Cleveland program.2" '
Second, the court determined that the money in the Ohio Pilot Scholarship
Program was not generally available. The money went only to selected children
who attended approved schools. All participating schools were private and 80% of
them were sectarian. 2 Therefore, the court concluded that Cleveland parents
lacked both a genuine choice between public or private schools,2 and a genuine
choice between sectarian and nonsectarian schools.2 4 Third, the court noted that
the money in the Cleveland program went to the schools, not to the student," '2 and
the "monies would go directly to support the regular educational program of a
religious institution including, in some cases, religious instruction.""' As a result,
"the Cleveland Program has the primary effect of advancing religion.""7
Three days after the court granted the preliminary injunction, the judge granted
a partial stay, ruling that students who were enrolled in the old program could
continue to receive aid either for another semester or until a final decision on the
injunction request whichever came first. " The court set trial for December 13,
1999.219 However, voucher supporters did not wait for the trial; they appealed the
injunction to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.' Ohio also appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which voted 5-4 to stay the preliminary injunction until the Sixth
Circuit disposed of the appeal."
On December 20, 1999, the U.S. District Court held in Zelman that "a program
which provides no meaningful choice to scholarship recipients other than to attend
sectarian schools violates the Establishment Clause." 2 The court issued a
210. Id. at 741.
211. See id at 734-35.
212. See id at 728-29.
213. See id at 737.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 728.
216. Id. at 741.
217. Id.
218. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, Nos. 1740, 1818, 1999 WL 669222, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug.
27, 1999).
219. See id.
220. See Newshour with Jim Lehrer: Vouchers on Trial (PBS Broadcast, September 2, 1999)(visited
Aug. 23, 2000) <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/education/july-dec99/vouchers_9-2a.htnl>.
221. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 120 S. Ct. 443, 443-44 (1999) (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, &
Breyer, J.J., dissenting).
222. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 861 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
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permanent injunction against the state's operation of the Cleveland voucher program,
although the injunction was stayed pending appeal to the Sixth Circuit. ,
In its reasoning, the Zelman court first noted that the Lemon test - whether the
law has a secular purpose, whether its primary effect is to advance or inhibit
religion, and whether there is excessive entanglement of church and state - remains
the applicable standard for deciding whether any government program violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.tm The court found that Agostini
"did not substantially alter" Establishment Clause jurisprudence.'m The Agostini
court had simply combined the entanglement and effects prongs and declared that
the effects prong forbids programs that "result in governmental indoctrination;
define its recipients by reference to religion; or create an excessive en-
tanglement."'
Next, the court determined that Nyquist, decided under Lemon, had not been
overruled and was applicable to the Cleveland voucher program.' The Nyquist
Court found the New York program unconstitutional because the aid went primarily
to sectarian schools and "[t]here was no attempt to separate secular from religious
educational functions and to ensure that the monies provided by the State supported
only the former."m In Cleveland, all schools participating in the program in 1999-
2000 were private, 82% of those schools were sectarian, 96% of voucher students
attended sectarian schools, and religious instruction was central to the mission of
these schools. Therefore, the Zelman court determined that the Cleveland
program, like that of New York, "overwhelmingly benefits sectarian schools."tm
Furthermore, "the grants provided under the Program are not restricted to supporting
only secular functions of a participating school's educational program[s]."'" Thus,
the two programs were "indistinguishable for Establishment Clause purposes.""
The court then rejected the defendants' contentions that the Cleveland voucher
program was constitutional because it fit the exceptions to Nyquist suggested in
footnote 38 of Nyquist and U.S. Supreme Court decisions following Nyquist. 3
The Zelman court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court did allow public assistance to
sectarian institutions and groups in Mueller, Witters, Zobrest, and Agostini.tm
223. See id. at 865.
224. See id. at 844.
225. Id.
226. Id (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)).
227. See id at 850.
228. Id. at 845-46.
229. See id at 836-37.
230. Id. at 849.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 847. In footnote 38, the Nyquist Court noted that it was not deciding "whether the
significantly religious character of the statute's beneficiaries might differentiate [Nyquist] from a case
involving some form of public assistance (e.g., scholarships) made available generally without regard to
the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefitted." Id. (quoting Nyquist).
234. See supra notes 88-119 and accompanying text (discussing these four cases). The State of Ohio
also argued that Rosenberger v. University of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995), meant the state would violate
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However, the Zelman court's analysis of these four cases showed the programs
to be very different from the Cleveland voucher program. In Mueller, parents could
qualify for the tax deduction whether their children attended public or private,
sectarian or nonsectarian schools.s However, in Cleveland, the state is funding
a program where "parents and their children do not have a significant choice
between parochial and nonparochial schools."' The lack of choice means the state
is promoting the sectarian choice. "
In contrast with the Cleveland program, recipients of the vocational rehabilitation
funds in Witters "had a genuine choice between attending sectarian or nonsectarian
and public or nonpublic institutions."ns Very little aid actually went to sectarian
institutions." In Zobrest, the aid went to the student and did not replace funds the
school would have spent on the student.' However, the Zelman court stressed
that Cleveland's voucher money went directly to the schools and "as the funds are
unrestricted, there are no safeguards in the Voucher Program to ensure that they will
be used only for secular instruction."2"
These aspects of the Cleveland program also distinguished it from the program
involved in Agostini, which used Title I funds to pay public school teachers to
provide remedial education to students regardless of the school attended. 42 No
money actually went to sectarian schools, the sectarian schools did not control the
use of the funds, and "the services could be utilized at any school."" In contrast,
the Zelman court noted that the Cleveland money went to the schools, the schools
did control the use, and students could only receive the funds at elected schools that
were almost all sectarian."
Thus, the court distinguished the Cleveland program from Mueller, Witters,
Zobrest, and Agostini because the Cleveland program provided unrestricted money
to selected schools that were overwhelmingly sectarian, depriving parents of any
real choice and creating "an incentive for persons to utilize state funds.., to attend
religious institutions."' Therefore, the court concluded that the Cleveland voucher
program violated the Establishment Clause because "[a] program that is so skewed
the Constitution by excluding sectarian schools from the program, but the Zelnan court found the
voucher program did not raise that issue. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 860.
235. See Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 851.
236. Id. at 853.
237. See id.
238. Id. at 855.
239. See id. at 854.
240. See id. at 855.
241. Id. at 857.
242. See id.
243. Id. at 859.
244. See id. at 860.
245. Id. at 863. The court did not examine choices available outside the voucher program because
"the Supreme Court has always assessed the question of 'choice' within the context of the challenged
program." Id. at 862.
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toward religion necessarily results in indoctrination attributable to the government
and provides financial incentives to attend religious schools."'
Thus, the district court grounded its decision on the U.S. Constitution and U.S.
Supreme Court precedents, not on state law or the state constitution. Many analysts
expect the case to eventually reach the Supreme Court. 7 The U.S. Supreme
Court's November 5, 1999, Zelman4 a memorandum staying the injunction pending
the Sixth Circuit's decision on the appeal may indicate a willingness to take the
case.
Indeed, Supreme Court review seemed even more likely by late 2000. On
December 11, 2000, a sharply divided Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
Zelman decision. 9 Cases which involve both civil liberties issues and lower court
divisions have a very good chance of a U.S. Supreme Court hearing.'
D. The Vermont Tuition Reimbursement Program
Vermont, like Maine, allows local school boards that do not have complete K-12
school systems to pay the tuition for local students to attend other public or private
schools. After the Chittenden School Board voted in December 1995 to pay tuition
at a local sectarian high school, the state stopped state aid to Chittenden." I On
June 11, 1999, the Supreme Court of Vermont held, in Chittenden v. Vermont, that
it is a violation of article 3 of the Vermont Constitution for a school district to make
unrestricted tuition payments to a sectarian high school.' The Chittenden court
noted that, because the Vermont tuition reimbursement statutes provided no
restrictions on the use of state-funded tuition money, tuition money given to a
246. Id. at 865.
247. See, e.g., Jodie Morse, Poor Gradefor Vouchers: A Judge Flunks Cleveland's Use of Vouchers
for Parochial Schools. But Will that Stall the Movement?, TIME, Dec. 31, 1999, at 220.
248. 120 S. Ct. 443 (1999).
249. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, No. 00-3055/3060/3063, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 31367, at *3,
*53 (6th Cir., Dec. 11, 2000). The Sixth Circuit's reasoning closely followed the reasoning of the district
court. The circuit court determined that Nyquist applied and that the Cleveland program fit none of the
exceptions to Nyquist. See id at *39, *42-47. In fact, the major difference between the circuit and
district court reasoning is that the circuit decision occurred after Mitchell. See supra notes 138-44 and
accompanying text. The Sixth Circuit majority made a point of noting that Mitchell was a plurality
decision and that the Cleveland program was the kind of direct subsidy of religion that Justice
O'Connor - concurring in Mitchell - "found impermissible." Id. at *45. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the Nyquist exceptions did not apply and held "that the voucher program has the primary
effect of advancing religion, and that it constitutes an endorsement of religion and sectarian education
in violation of the Establishment Clause." Jd at *47.
The lengthy dissent found the Cleveland program was the type of neutral choice program permitted
by the exceptions to Nyquist and accused the majority of being hostile to vouchers. See id at *53-90.
However, the majority countered that, because of the sectarian nature of the schools in the program,
almost 95% of students enrolled in 1999-2000 were in sectarian schools. See id. at *41. Thus, Cleveland
parents had only an "illusory choice." Id. at *51.
250. See ROBERT A. CAPP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCEss IN AMERICA 341 (3d ed. 1996).
251. See Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 542-43 (Vt. 1999).
252. See id. at 563-64.
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sectarian high school would support religious education. 3 However, the court did
not find an explicit statutory bar to the Chittenden board's action, so it turned next
to an examination of the Vermont Constitution.'
The Chittenden court stated that, because federal law on school aid and the
Establishment Clause was not clear,"s it was basing its decision on the Compelled
Support Clause of the Vermont Constitution. Looking to the historical record,
the court found that, for three reasons, the Chittenden School Board's policy
compels "dissenting... Vermont taxpayers to 'support [a] place of worship...
contrary to the dictates of conscience."'' First, the court noted that Vermont
consistently has viewed article 3 as forbidding "any public financial support of
religious activity.'" 8 Second, the debate over the "Virginia Bill for Religious
Liberty" influenced the Vermont Constitution, and in that debate, Thomas Jefferson
and James Madison were specifically concerned with preventing tax-funded religious
education.' Third, the Pennsylvania Constitution, which was an influence for
Vermont, had a clause that was a broad ban on aid to religion.'n The Chittenden
court also found the reasoning in the Jackson v. Benson 1 and Goff decisions did
not apply in Vermont because the Wisconsin Constitution had a different provision
and the Ohio Supreme Court equated Ohio's Compelled Support Clause with the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 2 On December 13, 1999, the U.S.
Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari, so the Chittenden decision
stands.'
E. The Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program
The voucher proposals of then-Texas Governor and 2000 Republican presidential
candidate George W. Bush resembled the statewide voucher plan in Florida,
promoted by his brother and Florida Governor Jeb Bush.' The Florida Oppor-
tunity Scholarship Program provided scholarship money to students who attended
a public school that received a failing performance grade for two years." Students
253. See id. at 545-46.
254. See id. at 546.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 547. Article 3, the Compelled Support Clause, reads in part: "That all persons have
a natural and unalienable right, to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own
consciences and understandings, as in their opinion shall be regulated by the word of God; and that no
person ought to, or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any
place or worship, or maintain any minister, contrary to the dictates of conscience ..... VT. CONST. ch.
1, art. 3, cited in Chittenden, 738 A.2d at 547.
257. Chittenden, 738 A.2d at 547 (citing the Vermont Constitution).
258. Id. at 554-55.
259. Id. at 555-56.
260. See id. at 556.
261. 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
262. See Chittenden, 738 A.2d at 559-60.
263. See Andrews v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., 120 S. Ct. 626 (1999).
264. See June Kronholz, Florida Judge Rejects School Vouchers That Are Pet Project of Gov. Jeb
Bush, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2000, at A4.
265. See Lyle Denniston, School Vouchers Nullified in Fla.; State Judge Blocks Use of Public
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could use the money (up to $3389 per year) to attend any private school, sectarian
or nonsectarian, or a higher-rated public school.'
In the 1999-2000 school year, only about fifty-three students from two schools
used vouchers to attend private schools. 7 But the state expected the program to
expand to perhaps eighty schools and 65,000 students by the 2000-2001 school
year. Thus, absent judicial challenge, the Florida program, if successful, could
have had a greater impact both in Florida and in the nation than any other voucher
program.
In March 2000, though, opponents challenged the Florida program, claiming that
it violated both article I, section 3 of the Florida Constitution and the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as well as article IX,
sections 1 and 6 of the Florida Constitution (dealing with education and public
school funding)." Judge L. Ralph Smith, Jr. of the Florida Circuit Court held in
Holmes v. Bush," that the Florida voucher program violated article IX, section 1
of the Florida Constitution.' Unlike the courts in Vermont, Maine, Ohio, or
Wisconsin, the Florida court saw no need to address either federal or state
constitutional provisions against establishment of religion. 3 Judge Smith thus did
not need to analyze U.S. Supreme Court decisions; he relied entirely on Florida
statutes, the Florida Constitution, and Florida case law. The court noted that article
IX, section 1 of the Florida Constitution requires the state to provide "a uniform,
efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools."'27 The court
concluded that "free public schools" means that the legislature must provide
education through public schools only.' s
Governor Jeb Bush appealed the Holmes ruling, and implementation was stayed
pending appeal.276 -On October 3, 2000, the First District Court of Appeals in
Florida reversed, holding that the trial court had "erred in finding" the Florida
voucher program "facially unconstitutional under article IX, section 1L"2f' Because
the circuit court had not considered whether the Florida voucher program violated
Money for Private Education, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 15, 2000, at 3A.
266. See Sue Anne Pressley & Kenneth J. Cooper, School Vouchers Rejected; Judge: Fla. Program
Unconstitutional, CHi. SuN-TIMEs, Mar. 15, 2000, at 32.
267. See Kronholz, supra note 264.
268. See id.
269. See supra note 11 (citing text of article I, section 3 of the Florida Constitution).
270. See National School Board Association, Summary: Circuit Court Rules That Florida Voucher
Program Violates State Constitution (March 2000) (visited Jan. 18, 2001)
<http'/www.nsbaorg/novouchers/vs..report.cfn?id=473&item=Court%20Cases> (summarizing the issues,
arguments, and findings of the court in Holmes v. Bush).
271. No. CV 97-3370, 2000 WL 526364 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 14,2000), rev'd and remanded, 767 So.
2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
272. See id. at *8.
273. See id. at *1 n.l.
274. Id. at *1.
275. Id. at *4-5.
276. See Denniston, supra note 265.
277. Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668, 677 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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article I, section 3 or article IX, section 6 of the Florida Constitution or the
Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the appeals court declined to rule on
those issues and remanded the case to the circuit court." Further proceedings are
needed to determine whether this case raises any federal constitutional issues that
can be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.'
V. Reasons for the Conflicting Opinions
Concerning the Constitutionality of Vouchers
A. Problems Applying Current Supreme Court Precedents
1. Comparing the Voucher Cases: Mixed Messages from Agostini
These post-Agostini cases dealing with voucher programs are not in agreement
about whether Agostini supports voucher programs. In Bagley and Zelman, the
courts view Agostini as having only a limited effect on Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. For those courts, Lemon and Nyquist are still good law, although
Agostini does allow limited forms of direct aid carefully restricted only to
supplement the programs of sectarian schools.' However, the Jackson and Goff
courts conclude that Agostini has changed Lemon and Nyquist and that, so long as
the programs channel the aid through the parents and let the parents choose the
child's school, no restrictions on the use of the money are needed and the aid can
pay for the regular school program."I
2. Confusion Over Applying Agostini
There are at least two sources of this confusion over Agostini. First, the Agostini
Court seems more open to direct state aid to sectarian schools, but does not overturn
Nyquist or reject the Lemon test. Second, Agostini is about New York's effort to
implement a federal grant program that supplements existing educational programs
and offers assistance to private schools that already serve lower-income students.
The remedial instruction is provided in the private schools, but by state employees.
Depending on the specifics of the particular voucher program, Agostini may or may
not be relevant.
B. Specifics of Programs Aiding Sectarian Schools
Details in these programs make a big difference. Does the tax money go to and
stay with the child (or the parents) or is it quickly transferred to the school? Is the
aid restricted to clearly secular education or could it be used for religious purposes?
Does the government aid supplement the private education or actually subsidize the
regular school program? Is the program available to all students or only those in
278. See id.
279. See Denniston, supra note 265.
280. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 844,850 (N.D. Ohio 1999), aff d 234 F.3d
945 (6th Cir. 2000); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 141-42, 146 (Me. 1999).
281. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d
602, 615-17 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
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private schools? Are sectarian schools specifically included or excluded? Is the
program supplementing the public school system or is it taking students and tax
money from the public schools?'
A 1985 analysis of cases noted that programs providing direct aid were likely to
be found unconstitutional whether courts found entanglement or not.2 However,
programs providing indirect aid were constitutional if there was no evidence of
excessive entanglement?' Programs that served all taxpayers, such as tax credits
for all, were likely to be constitutional, while those that were selective were more
likely to fail.' Especially important from a public policy point of view is the
relative cost of the program to the public school system. A program that grants a
small tax credit, which is still large enough to encourage parents to transfer a child
to a private school, leaves the public schools with more dollars per pupil." 6
However, a program that assigns all (or a significant percentage) of the tax dollars
per pupil to the private school selected by the child's parents (the approach preferred
by Milton Friedman and used in most voucher programs) takes substantial funds
from the public schools and gives a much higher incentive to parents to choose
private schools.'
The specifics of a program raise many other practical policy issues. For example,
supporters, such as Kenneth Blackwell, Secretary of State for Ohio and Chair of the
Steve Forbes 2000 presidential campaign, assert voucher and other school choice
programs empower parents, free children trapped in poorly performing public
schools, and create the competition needed to improve the public schools. 8
Blackwell says the academic performance of students in the Cleveland voucher
program improved. 9 Opponents, such as Sandra Feldman, President of the
American Federation of Teachers, counter that the $10 million spent on the
Cleveland voucher program took funds from the public schools that could have been
used to pay for reading programs or reduce class size, which are known to improve
student learning. According to Feldman, private schools opened in Cleveland,
took voucher money, and then had to close because the students did so poorly."'
282. See Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers are Unconstitutional, and Why They're Not, 13 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICs & PuB. PoL'Y 397, 404-06 (1999) (reviewing factors affecting the constitutionality
of government aid to sectarian schools).
283. See West, supra note 129, at 796, 844.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 846-49.
286. See id. at 847.
287. See id. at 847-49.
288. See CBS News: Face the Nation (CBS broadcast, Sept. 5, 1999), transcript available in 1999
WVL 16237919; STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIvIALIzE RELIGIoUs DEVOTION 195-200 (1993) (arguing that parental choice in favor of sectarian
schools is more influenced by the values taught than by the difference in academic quality, which may
not exist).
289. See CBS News: Face the Nation, supra note 288.
290. See id.
291. See id.
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For some supporters of vouchers, the point is not whether the schools are better,
but that parents who have a choice are more likely to be involved in their children's
education.' Parental involvement, they point out, improves student success.
Opponents agree with this last statement, but note that is one of the main problems
with comparing successes of voucher students and students staying in the public
school. Parents who take advantage of vouchers are parents who are involved in
their children's education. 3
C. How Parties Frame the Issues for the Courts
Arguments before the courts raise a variety of issues: Establishment Clause, First
Amendment, Equal Protection, and state constitutional questions. The Bagley court
responded at length to Equal Protection concerns.' The Chittenden, Jackson,
Holmes, and Goff courts are particularly concerned about state constitutional
issues.' Zelman concentrates on Establishment Clause questions.2 " Different
issues produce different results.
As the Chittenden decision illustrates, state constitutions do not contain identical
religion clauses. Some states follow the First Amendment, while others have some
form of the Compelled Support Clause. Except for Vermont and Maryland, all
states specifically ban either tax support to any religious institution or school or
taxpayer aid to any private school.' Fourteen of the seventeen most restrictive
states, including Oklahoma, are in the West."' Because of the variety of
constitutional provisions, courts in about half of the states do not apply federal
interpretation of the First Amendment to state constitutional provisions.'
Decisions that rest on state constitutional provisions do not apply to other states.
However, courts in other states might be influenced by the reasoning and adopt it.
292. See Witte, supra note 24, at 65-66, 118-19 (noting that parents of Milwaukee voucher students
were more involved before their children were selected and that their involvement increased, partly
because voucher schools required parental involvement).
293. See id
294. Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 136-38 (Me. 1999).
295. Holmes v. Bush, No. 97-3370, 2000 WL 526364, at * I n. I (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 14, 2000), rev'd
and remanded, 767 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203,
211-16 (Ohio 1999); Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 547, 554-63
(Vt. 1999); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 620-30 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998).
296. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 850-60 (N.D. Ohio 1999), affd 234 F.3d 945
(6th Cir. 2000).
297. See Chittenden v. Vermont, 738 A.2d 539,558 (citing Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause:
Enforcing Separation of Church and State through State Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA. L. REv. 625,
631-45 & nn.31-47 (1985)); see also Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First
Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 657, 670-72 (1998) (claiming
these restrictions are rooted more in anti-Catholic prejudice than in convictions about separation of
church and state).
298. See Viteritti, supra note 297, at 674-75. The other states are: Florida, Georgia, Montana, and
New York. See id. at 675 & n.87.
299. See id. at 680-81.
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D. Political Dynamics and Policy Concerns
Most of the arguments for and against the wisdom of voucher plans concern policy
choices made by the executive and legislative branches. However, judges also make
policy choices, and the political dynamics of judicial selection and judges' personal
policy preferences can influence judicial decisions."° For example, Judge Higgin-
botham, the trial court judge who found the Wisconsin plan unconstitutional, was both
liberal and the only African American on the bench. Ohio's Republican governor
appointed Judge Sadler, the trial judge who ruled in favor of the governor's voucher
planO ' In Wisconsin and Ohio, where appellate judges are selected by nonpartisan
electiont the state supreme courts upheld the voucher plans as constitutional. In
Vermont, where appellate judges are chosen by merit selection, and in Maine, which
uses gubernatorial appointment,' the judges also upheld the voucher plans, but this
time ruling against those who wanted to expand the program. Federal court judges
have life tenure, which in theory insulates them from political pressures and promotes
independent judgment.' So far, the federal judges in both Ohio and Maine have
indicated that they are not inclined to find a voucher program that includes sectarian
schools consistent with the Establishment Clause as applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
At the U.S. Supreme Court level, the Justices have split 5-4 on recent aid to
sectarian schools questions. The general consensus is that, if the U.S. Supreme Court
were hearing a voucher case today, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy,
Scalia, and Thomas would support vouchers and Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens,
and Breyer would not.'
Despite the optimism her Agostini opinion generated in voucher supporters, Justice
O'Connor is harder to predict. She prefers narrow, case-specific decisions and tends
to support only programs that do not advance religion. , Some analysts believe
MitchelfH shows that O'Connor and Breyer "would oppose any parochial-aid
program that, in their eyes, jeopardized the wall between church and state." ' On
300. See generally CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 250, at 229-87.
301. See Kemerer, supra note 3, at 37.
302. See CARP & SIDHAM, supra note 250, at 258 tbl.8-4.
303. See id.
304. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 42 (7th ed. 1998).
305. See Byrd, supra note 12, at 1954. Professor John Yoo of Berkeley Law School says the
plurality in Mitchell v. Helms (Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and Scalia) would
clearly support a voucher program that provided benefits to all students. See Newshour with Jim Lehrer:
Supreme Court Wrap (PBS television broadcast transcript, June 29, 2000) (visited July 9, 2000)
<http:l/www.pbs.org/newshourbbllaw/jan-juneOl/scotus-wrap-6-29.html> (interviewing four
constitutional law professors).
306. See Byrd, supra note 12, at 1954. Professor Sanford V. Levinson has said: "trying to predict
O'Connor is like slaughtering a sheep and reading the entrails." Id. Professor Jesse Choper also notes
Justice O'Connor's preference for narrow, specific decisions in cases involving aid to religion. See The
Court's Manoeuvres, ECONOMIST, Sept. 4-10, 1999, at 34, 34.
307. See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
308. Taylor, supra note 138, at 22.
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the other hand, Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School reads Mitchell as
evidence that the Court is "moving... toward a simple rule that, if aid is neutral and
secular and doesn't create a great danger of government endorsement of religion, it's
fine" and that O'Connor will soon provide a fifth vote for vouchers.'
The dynamics on the Court could change by the time the Court takes a voucher
case. Justice Ginsburg had cancer surgery in September 1999, and Justice Stevens
turned eighty in 2000. Close Court votes on many contentious issues, combined with
the health and age of some Court members, fueled speculation about the impact of the
2000 presidential election on future Court appointments"
Vouchers continue to be a hot political issue. Even before 1999, Republican
presidential candidates and several Republican governors were on record as supporting
vouchers?" Governor George W. Bush supported vouchers and advocated federal
voucher funding?' Vice President Al Gore labeled vouchers a "mistake" in his
presidential campaign ads."' Significant numbers of Democratic voters opposed
vouchers, while many conservative Republican voters supported them?" However,
this does not mean that all Democrats oppose all voucher programs or that all
Republicans support vouchers. In 1999, the Republican leadership in the U.S. House
of Representatives pushed hard to provide vouchers in the Title I education program
that aids poor and disadvantaged children? 5 They failed twice, and fifty-two
Republicans voted with Democrats to defeat a proposal by Majority Leader Dick
Armey (R.-Tex.)?"6 The 2000 Democratic candidate for Vice President, Sen. Joseph
Lieberman (D.-Conn.), was on record supporting vouchers."' In addition, many
Democrats do support other choice proposals. t
So far, despite the policy debates and the media attention given to vouchers,3"9
national public opinion still strongly supports public education. In the 1999 Phi Delta
Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, 49% gave the
public schools an "A" or "B" grade, and another 31% gave the schools a C.
''
0
309. Newshour with Jim Lehrer: Supreme Court Wrap, supra note 305.
310. See Taylor, supra note 138, at 20-23.
311. See Rob Boston, State of the States: Religious School Aid Battles Around the Country, CHURCH
& STATE, Feb. 1999, at 11, I1 (providing state by state summaries of voucher proposals).
312. See Pressley & Cooper, supra note 266.
313. See Morse, supra note 247, at 220.
314. See Clemetson, supra note 30, at 30.
315. See Rob Boston, Congressional Alert, CHURCH & STATE, Feb. 1999, at 13, 13. Both Aguilar
v. Fenton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) and Agostini v. Fenton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), involved the use of Title
I funds in New York. If Congress had transformed Title I into a voucher program, voucher supporters
could have claimed Congress saw Agostini as a U.S. Supreme Court endorsement of vouchers.
316. See Sue Kirchhoff, House Passes Title I Overhaul Bill Minus Vouchers and Broad Block
Grants, 57 CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2521, 2521-22 (1999). Only three Democrats voted for Armey's
proposal. The Senate proposal did not include vouchers. See id.
317. See Terence Samuel, Lieberman's Edgier Than He Appears: Like Cheney's, A Rich Record for
Friends and Foes, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Aug. 21, 2000, at 19, 20.
318. See Koch, supra note 23, at 285.
319. See Witte, supra note 24, at 171-77 (describing simplified media stories of failing students and
schools saved by vouchers).
320. See Lowell C. Rose & Alec M. Gallup, The 31st Annual Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll of the
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When parents were asked to grade the school attended by their oldest child, 66% gave
the school an "A" or "B. '32' When respondents were asked whether they would
prefer "improving and strengthening the existing public schools or providing vouchers
for parents to use in selecting and paying for private and/or church related school,"
70% preferred to improve the public schools, and 28% wanted vouchers.
31
Public opinion is sharply divided on vouchers. The 1999 Phi Delta Kappa poll
found that 41% favored letting parents and students choose a private school at public
expense, while 55% were opposed 2' From 1966 through 1998, voters rejected
twenty-one of twenty-two state referenda proposing vouchers or tuition tax credits.3"
Whether public officials support or oppose vouchers, they will offend a significant
percentage of the voters. While some candidates are convinced that supporting
vouchers can gain them votes from particular voting blocs,3' judges may see no
advantage in taking on such a divisive issue.
VI. Alternatives for the U.S. Supreme Court
A. Continue to Deny Certiorari to Voucher Cases and Let the States Decide
So far the U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari to the Wisconsin, Maine, and
Vermont voucher cases and to the Arizona Tax Credit case that raises similar issues.
The Court has not given reasons for the denials. In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court
decision in Goff could not be appealed because it was decided on state constitutional
grounds. While Court members have often said that denial of certiorari does not mean
the Court agrees with the lower court's decision,3" denial does mean that the party
who won in the lower court often claims a victory in the U.S. Supreme Court as
well.32
U.S. Supreme Court observers, and even Justices who have written about the Court,
offer many possible reasons for denial of certiorari other than a consideration of the
merits. First, the Court may simply believe that an issue is not yet ripe for a
decision.32 Second, the Court may believe that a case is so atypical that deciding it
Public's Attitudes Toward the Public SchooLs, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 1999, at 41, 42.
321. See id.
322. ld. at 44.
323. See id. at 53. The public was also sharply divided over whether publicly funded vouchers
should pay all the tuition at private schools, but the public was more willing to support partial payments
or tuition tax credits. See id. at 53-54.
324. See Albert J. Menendez, Voters Versus Vouchers: An Analysis of Referendum Data, PHI DELTA
KAPPAN, Sept. 1999, at 76-80 (arguing that thirty years of voter rejection of vouchers shows that
lawmakers should focus not on vouchers but on improving public schools attended by ninety percent of
students).
325. See id.
326. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITIcS 240-41
(4th ed. 1996).
327. See Richard Carelli, School Aid Tax Breaks Allowed, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 5, 1999, at I
(reporting that aid supporters see this as support for voucher programs).
328. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 230-34 (1991).
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will not guide later cases3 ' Third, the Court may conclude that there is no clearly
presented federal question." ' Fourth, a case may be asking about a settled question
of law that the Court does not believe needs changing. Fifth, the Court may see no
need to take a case because there are "adequate and independent state grounds" for
resolving the issues raised?
While federal constitutional questions are present in the voucher cases, the U.S.
Supreme Court may want to see a range of voucher cases before accepting one or
several for review. Perhaps the Court denied certiorari in the Maine case because the
Maine voucher program is not typical. In addition, all the voucher cases have focused
at least in part on state constitutional provisions. The Maine and Vermont cases
looked specifically to the state constitutional provisions on aid to sectarian schools.
The Wisconsin and the first Ohio case (Simmons-Harris v. GofJ) looked in detail at
the appropriations requirements in their state constitutions.
The extent to which this state focus may be a successful tactic of either the voucher
supporters or the voucher opponents is not clear?3 " If voucher opponents rely on a
state constitution that appears to restrict aid to sectarian schools, they may get a court
that interprets the provision to mean the same as the First Amendment and use
Agostini to allow vouchers. On the other hand, voucher supporters may believe that
the state supreme court will be able to use the state constitution to permit more aid to
sectarian schools, but may be left with an unfavorable decision that lacks grounds for
appeal?33
If the U.S. Supreme Court concludes that the lower courts based their decisions
mainly on their state constitutions, the Court may decide that there are no grounds for
granting review. " Furthermore, the Court in recent years has been supportive of the
role of the states in the federal system. The Court could therefore decide that, because
education funding is primarily a state function, vouchers are an issue that the states
should decide."' This reasoning could enable the Court to stay out of the voucher
issue either because of restraint, or because of federalism, or both. Letting the state
courts decide the issue, however, would essentially mean the Court was letting the
states decide a First Amendment issue that the framers saw as fundamental for the
entire country and that both sides in the voucher dispute claim the Court needs to
329. See id. at 234-36.
330. See O'BRIEN, supra note 326, at 204-13.
331. WILLIAM B. LOCKHART Er AL, CONS1TrTONAL LAW: CASES - COMMENTS - QUESTIONS
56-57 (8th ed. 1996).
332. See Viteritti, supra note 297, at 659 (indicating that opponents of school vouchers are counting
on restrictive state constitutions to limit aid to parochial schools).
333. See Kemerer, supra note 3. But cf Witte, supra note 24, at 179-80 (arguing that voucher
supporters are using vouchers for poor children to create sympathetic pro-voucher precedents that can
then be used to support universal vouchers).
334. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994) (discussing the grounds for granting certiorari in state court
decisions).
335. See Viteritti, supra note 297, at 659-60 (stressing the importance of the Court's federalism
views in its interpretation of state choices in school aid). Certainly, the Court is not likely to tell
Vermont and Maine to end their rural multidistrict voucher programs.
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decide. In addition, if the Court continues to let lower courts decide what Agostini
means, the Court's influence would decline.
B. Use Agostini to Find All Voucher Programs Constitutional
Some observers believe there are enough votes on the Court to use Agostini to find
all voucher programs constitutional.3" Even if there are not enough votes now, there
might be enough by the time a case reaches the Court. Voucher supporters note that
the Court's emphasis on neutrality and parental choice in Mueller, Witters, Zobrest,
and Agostini points to a Court that is ready to allow vouchers so long as the aid is
indirect and does not differentiate between public and private or sectarian and
nonsectarian schools?'
Voucher opponents, however, argue that finding voucher programs that pay tuition
to sectarian schools constitutional would present the Court with two big problems.
First, these programs are "neutral" with regard to religion only if one does not look
at the actual effect of the programs.?' Because most of the private schools in the
United States are sectarian and because poor families receiving vouchers rarely can
afford the extra costs of the nonsectarian private schools, voucher programs in practice
limit the choice most poorer children have to attend sectarian schools.33 In effect,
the tax money induces parents to choose sectarian over nonsectarian education and
thus the programs are not neutral. Lower court decisions against voucher programs
have emphasized that the programs are not neutral in practice.
Second, one of the arguments made by voucher supporters is that parents who pay
taxes to support the public schools should be able to spend those taxes as they feel is
best for their children?' However, to create a precedent for individual tax expen-
diture in one area would likely lead to cases asking for choice in tax expenditures in
other policy areas. Such a result could be disruptive to state and local governments
and would go against the Court's suggestion that the federal courts should, to the
extent possible, let state and local governments make their own decisions.
C. Limit Agostini and Find Only Selected Vouchers Constitutional
Existing precedents appear consistent with voucher programs that exclude religious
schools or are narrowly targeted to help a student rather than a school. This seems the
more likely and desirable alternative for the Court. Voucher supporters have read
Witters, Mueller, Zobrest, and Agostini as allowing a broad range of state and federal
aid to sectarian schools. However, the holdings in these cases have been quite narrow.
Mueller stresses that the tax deduction for tuition is only one of many tax deductions
and is provided to all parents regardless of what type of school their children
336. See Chopko, supra note 85, at 960-63.
337. See id, at 957.
338. See Hamilton, supra note 33, at 838. This point is found in the reasoning of the Ohio Court
of Appeals, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, and the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio. See Koch, supra note 23, at 284, 289.
339. See Koch, supra note 23, at 284, 289.
340. See Miller, supra note 12, at 16.
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attend . " However, though the Mueller Court emphasizes the "neutrality," it is also
significant that administration of deductions by the tax commission does not involve
the detailed supervision common in voucher programs. Thus, Mueller deals with a
program that requires little interaction of church and state. Vouchers go to particular
students in particular schools that must comply with specific state requirements. The
interaction of church and state is much greater, then, in voucher situations.
In Witters and Zobrest, the Court stresses that public money can go to a sectarian
school. But, in both cases the aid goes to the student, and in both cases the amount
of aid to sectarian schools is quite small. Voucher supporters note that giving the
money to the student means the decision of where to spend the money is private.
Voucher opponents point to the limited nature of the aid. Voucher programs that
involve millions of dollars in a single metropolitan school system clearly do not
involve limited aid.
Accepting the argument that precedents do allow some indirect aid to go to students
who spend it on tuition at sectarian schools does not mean that all programs that pay
tuition at sectarian schools are constitutional. While criticisms of the Court's decisions
on aid to sectarian schools use such adjectives as "unhelpful" and "confusing," one
reason is that the decisions are very fact-specific.' The Court has looked at how
programs affect students, how programs impact schools, how the programs are
administered, and the motivation behind the programs. This case-specific approach has
allowed the Court to approve programs that, on balance, seem to benefit the students as
individuals and disapprove programs that seem to benefit sectarian schools as a whole.
VII. Alternatives for Oklahoma and Other States
A. Areas of Concern for State Policy-Makers
Are vouchers good public policy for the states? Both supporters and opponents of
vouchers base their arguments on ideology rather than facts." As discussed in the
introduction, supporters of vouchers and related choice programs believe that
introducing an element of choice for students will allow students from poorer families
to escape failing school systems. In addition, supporters claim vouchers could create
competition that would pressure the public schools to improve. Many voucher
supporters also believe that the private schools will do a better job with less money
because they do not have to deal with the costs of public school administration.'
On the other hand, voucher opponents emphasize that public schools, unlike the
private ones, have to take all students, including students with learning disabilities and
other special needs. u5 In addition, voucher opponents say a major cause of problems
in city schools is that there is not enough tax money to provide the special programs
341. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983).
342. CARTER, supra note 288, at 110; DAVID M. O'BRIEN, SUPREME COURT WATCH - 1994, at
70 (1994).
343. See Metcalf & Tait, supra note 35, at 66.
344. But see Witte, supra note 24, at 105-06 (noting that voucher supporters tend to underestimate
both costs of private schools and existing public school responsiveness to political pressure).
345. See Koch, supra note 23, at 287.
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and small classes that would improve the public schools' Opponents further argue
that taking money, as well as some of the better students and some of the most
committed parents, away from the public schools will simply guarantee that the public
schools will get worse. 7
Therefore, as Oklahoma and other states ponder the issue of school choice and
especially the issue of vouchers, there are three main areas that need careful analysis.
First, there is the question of whether vouchers are an effective way to improve public
education. Second, even if state officials are convinced that vouchers work when
properly implemented, the officials also have to determine whether vouchers will solve
the educational problems in their particular state. Third, state officials have to decide
whether vouchers are permissible under their state constitutional provisions.
1. Are Voucher Programs Effective?
Whether voucher programs work depends in part on what the programs are
expected to achieve.' Proponents of voucher programs in urban areas usually have
three goals: (1) improving education for children from poor families or for children
from poorly performing schools; (2) improving the entire public school system; and
(3) reducing the costs of public education."
One way to improve the education of children from low-income families is to make
it possible for those children to attend better schools. An adequately funded voucher
program could allow students to choose to attend private schools. The voucher
programs in Milwaukee and Cleveland do provide, as supporters claim, more choices
for the participating students who were not attending private schools before they
received vouchers. In Milwaukee, for example, parents of choice students were more
dissatisfied with the public schools than parents of non-choice students." Parents
of choice students reported that they were more satisfied with the schools participating
in the voucher program.3"'
However, voucher programs, especially if they become universal, are not likely to
increase the percentage of less wealthy students gaining access to private schools.
Because of the lack of data on the impact of vouchers below the college level, one
analysis examines whether public aid to college students has actually expanded
educational opportunities for needy students?' U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the
346. See Miller, supra note 12, at 26.
347. Cf. id. at 12-17 (discussing differences between public and private school models).
348. In Maine and Vermont, the programs were designed to provide access to publicly funded
education for residents in rural areas. Not all parents like the choices available, but the Maine and
Vermont programs do what the legislature intended. See Wasilausky, supra note 26, at 724.
349. See John Cassidy, Schools Are Her Business, THE NEW YORKER, October 18 & 25, 1999, at
144, 146-47. But see Witte, supra note 24, at 208 (concluding that many voucher proponents' ultimate
goal is universal vouchers that would primarily help private schools and middle and upper-middle class
students).
350. See Witte, supra note 24, at 66-68.
351. See id. at 117-18.
352. See F. King Alexander, The Decline and Fall of the Wall of Separation between Church and
State and its Consequences for the Funding of Public and Private Institutions of Higher Education, 10
U. FLA. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 103, 122-27 (1998).
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1960s and 1970s allowed public aid to go to church-related colleges because such
colleges usually lack a pervasively religious atmosphere?' Since the 1960s, state
and federal student college aid programs have grown substantially. Although this aid
goes disproportionately to private colleges, the percentage of lower-income students
at private colleges has dropped, not increased?' While many private colleges have
become dependent on the aid, "[m]eaningful choice for the poor has not been
enhanced."3"
If the college aid analogy is valid, vouchers will not increase choice for the poor
in any significant way. In Milwaukee, voucher funds did save some participating
schools from bankruptcy and thus preserved those schools as choices for parents. The
expansion of the program to include sectarian schools was expected to save many
more schools." The importance of public funds to the survival of the schools
explains why religious groups are strong supporters of voucher systems."m
However, even if vouchers mean more choices are available and more parents are
satisfied with those choices, that does not mean that the students who use the vouchers
are receiving a better education. Studies of both the Cleveland and Milwaukee
programs have reached inconsistent conclusions on this issue. For example, Paul
Peterson, Jay Greene, and Jiangtao Du of the pro-voucher Harvard Program on
Education Policy and Governance found evidence that voucher students in Milwaukee
had better math and reading skills than students who remained in the public
schools.W However, John Witte, who supports only targeted vouchers and who
studied the Milwaukee program for the Wisconsin legislature, finds that Peterson's
conclusions rely on invalid data?" Witte's analysis of student achievement scores for
the first five years of the program determines "that annual change scores are modest,
not appreciably differing from zero."'
Similar inconsistent results exist in studies of the Cleveland program. One study
concluded that the voucher program had not raised test scores, 6' while another study
found test scores had risen?' Analyzing data from the first two years of the Ohio
voucher program for the Ohio Department of Education, Kim Metcalf, Director of the
Indiana Center for Evaluation at the University of Indiana School of Education, and
her associates found some evidence of improvement in voucher students by the second
353. See id. at 119.
354. See id. at 126.
355. Ie at 127. Alexander concludes that "[i]f the experience in higher education is a valid
indicator, then one can expect that state voucher programs at elementary and secondary education levels
will only produce a marginal increase in choice for lower-income students while greatly increasing
inequalities in state-funded revenue between public and private schools." Id.
356. See Witte, supra note 24, at 116.
357. See id. at 161-62.
358. See id. at 133.
359. See id. at 133-43.
360. id. at 125.
361. See Rene Sanchez, In Cleveland, Vouchers Fail to Raise Test Scores, WASH. POST, April 8,
1998, at A2.
362. See Sorting out School Choice, ECONOMIST, Sept. 4-10, 1999, at 33, 33.
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year of the program.2 However, partly because "voucher students in Cleveland were
achieving at slightly higher levels than their public school peers before they entered
their voucher schools,"3" it was unclear whether the improvement was a result of the
voucher program. When Jay Greene, William Howell, and Paul Peterson re-analyzed
this data, they concluded the voucher students had improved significantly over public
school students in the first two years of the program.3
Why are there so many disputes over achievement? In part this variation in results
reflects inadequate data. The voucher programs are new, small, and selective." The
attrition of students from the Milwaukee program meant that some sample sizes were
too small for reliable testing?' Even counting all students in public and private
voucher programs, the total in 1999 was less than one percent of elementary and
secondary students.3 In addition, students selected for the Cleveland and Milwaukee
voucher programs differed from public school students in a number of ways, some of
which were significant." Thus, finding test and control groups that are large enough
and equivalent to each other is not easy.
Another problem with assessments of program effectiveness is possible bias that
may influence data collection and analysis. The fourteen privately funded voucher
programs and two of the voucher schools in Cleveland use self-evaluation techni-
ques.3 ' Metcalf and her associates did not use data from those two Cleveland
schools, but Greene and his associates did use it. Cecilia Rouse, who teaches
economics and public policy at Princeton University, re-analyzed the Milwaukee data
used by Peterson and by Witte and concluded that both studies had statistical
flaws?3 Enthusiasm for or antagonism toward vouchers can create bias in
interpreting or using data. Public school critics find positive voucher results more
convincing, while public school supporters are more skeptical.3"
Even proponents of vouchers admit that vouchers only produce modest
improvements in performance and that those improvements are best explained by the
parents' showing an interest in their child's education3" or by controlling for family
background?74 When only the "most motivated" parents apply for the limited number
363. See Metcalf & Tait, supra note 35, at 70-72.
364. Id. at 71.
365. See id. at 73.
366. See id.
367. For discussion of methodological problems, see Edward Muir & F. Howard Nelson, Social
Science Examinations of the Milwaukee Voucher Experiment (visited Oct. 4, 1999)
<http"//www.aft.org/research/vouchers/mil/rouse/rouse.htm>.
368. See Miller, supra note 12, at 16.
369. See Metcalf & Tait, supra note 35, at 71.
370. See id. at 67, 72.
371. See Cecilia Elena Rouse, Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement: An Evaluation
of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, 113 Q.J. OF ECON. 553, 553-59 (1998) (finding statistically
significant evidence that children in the program improved their math skills, but not their reading skills).
372. See Cassidy, supra note 349, at 144, 156.
373. See id. at 160.
374. See Muir & Nelson, supra note 367, % 3.
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of vouchers, 75 there is a bias in the data that is difficult for even an objective analyst
to overcome.
A second goal of voucher programs is improvement of public schools through
competition.376 The idea is to give vouchers to all students and let the students
choose which public or private school to attend. The assumption is that poorly
performing public schools will either improve or will close because few students
choose to attend them.3 Research by Caroline Hoxby, who teaches economics at
Harvard, has attracted a great deal of attention because she "attempts to show that
public schools perform better when they face competition, that class size makes no
difference to how students perform, and that teachers' unions make schools less
productive."3 While her research, which compares public schools where there is
competition from nearby public and private schools with public schools that lack such
competition, has received substantial national and international attention," there is
concern that her enthusiasm for vouchers has led her to misread her data and ignore
important variables.3
In contrast, John Witte, who teaches political science at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, found two reasons why it is impossible to tell whether the
Milwaukee voucher program had any effect on public school quality in its first five
years."' First, the program was too small to create competition." Second, the
public schools "are constantly reforming, experimenting, and reorganizing" and that
change cannot be separated from any voucher effect2' The voucher program did
mean the public schools received less money. Also, the public schools were less able
to predict enrollment patterns because some students signed up for both public and
private schools and because students in private schools that closed at mid-year had to
return to the public schools.' " But there is no evidence that vouchers had a positive
or negative effect on the public school programs."
Witte does predict that expanding the Milwaukee program to a universal voucher
program would harm the public schools and reduce the choices available to the poor.
In the 1990-95 Milwaukee program, participants who met the income limitations were
chosen by random selection. But, when voucher programs drop income limitations and
375. Cassidy, supra note 349, at 147.
376. See Sorting Out School Choice, ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 1999, at 33.
377. See Cassidy, supra note 349. at 147.
378. Id. at 144.
379. See id. at 154-55. Hoxby's analysis substitutes the number of rivers and streams for the number
of school districts to avoid one form of statistical bias. Critics note that the number of rivers and streams
are often linked with urbanization and industrialization, so she may simply be measuring the link between
economic development and improved school performance, not the impact of competition on schools. See
id. at 155.
380. See id at 154.
381. See Witte, supra note 24, at 115-16.
382. See iL at 115.
383. Id. at 115-16.
384. See id. at 106-07, 115. Witte also suggests a third reason: some of the participating private
schools were financially and academically marginal. See id. at 107-09.
385. See id. at 115-16.
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do not use random selection, vouchers go primarily to middle-class students already
enrolled in private schools or skim the best students from the public schools. '
While Witte supports voucher programs targeted at the urban poor, he is worried that
targeted programs create political pressures to expand the programs and he fears that
the result would be public funding for many private schools that primarily serve the
white middle class.3 The less wealthy would attend either less selective private
schools or a public school system with decreased funding and decreased public
support." Funding is a major concern of voucher supporters, voucher opponents,
and those who are neutral on the issue of vouchers.
A third goal of voucher proponents is saving money. Voucher supporters claim that
private schools do a better job for much less money. Some studies claim private
schools cost only half as much as public schools.3W ' However, one study that
compares public and private school expenditures for similar services finds the
differences are not great and that the public schools may even cost less.3? '
Costs and management of funds may be the concerns that need the most analysis
by state legislators and executives. For states, spending on elementary and secondary
schools is a big percentage of the state budget.9 ' Much of state politics focuses on
public education. If the experience of Ohio and Wisconsin is typical, voucher
programs add to both the cost and the political turmoil of public education
programs?'
In Milwaukee, for example, the public schools lost about nine students per
school.3? ' While the school lost the per pupil state funding, they did not lose enough
students to justify staff cuts needed to reduce costs.3" The result was the Milwaukee
public school system had a 1999 net funding loss of $22 million.3"
These disputes over funding reflect the fact that these programs have the potential
to shift massive amounts of public money from the public to the private schools.
Because state government is responsible for the spending of tax money, audits are
required. In Ohio, a financial and performance audit found mismanagement of funds
and numerous violations of the eligibility rules." In the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school
years, vouchers were given to thirty students from families with incomes above
$50,000. Participants were transported to school in taxis, and the program spent
$419,000 for taxi rides when the children were absent. Part of the problem was that
386. See i&. at 74-82.
387. See id. at 197, 206-07.
388. See id. at 202-05.
389. See id. at 106.
390. See i.
391. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FAcTs 1999, at 115 (1998) (showing the largest line
item in 1996 and 1997 state budgets is spending on elementary and secondary education). Calculations
by the author show this line item is almost 27% of state budgets.
392. See Witte, supra note 24, at 162-71 (describing conflicts in Milwaukee and Cleveland).
393. See Hirsh & Samuelson, supra note 57, at 12, 16.
394. See id.
395. See id.
396. See Dennis J. Willard, Voucher Program Receives Bad News, AKRON BEACON J., Jan. 6, 1999,
at 1.
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the administrators let the participating schools check residency and income of
students?'
In addition to financial accountability concerns, one voucher supporter believes that
a well-designed voucher program would actually cost a state more, not less, for two
reasons. First, if the Supreme Court determines that the programs are constitutional,
states or a private foundation would need to fund a multi-year program with millions
of children and increased funding to determine whether the programs work.'
Second, private and especially sectarian schools tend to cost less because they pay
teachers less, save the costs of gyms and auditoriums by using church facilities, and
don't offer mandated programs like special education classes, English as a Second
Language, breakfast, and transportation." For voucher programs to stimulate the
growth of new public and private schools that provide a full range of educational
services, voucher programs need realistic funding. Many private schools that
charge less are in serious financial difficulties and need public funds to survive. Some
estimates suggest a universal voucher system would increase public expenditure on
education from 11.3% to 27.2%, depending on the level of funding."'
Thus, it is not surprising that many voucher opponents fear that vouchers are a plan
for cutting public school funding. Achieving broad-based support for vouchers
requires adequate funding. In addition, programs that privatize or partially privatize
public services have hidden costs: states must develop new bureaucracies to supervise
the private entities. If voucher programs cost significantly more than the current
system of school funding, Oklahoma and other states with constitutional restrictions
on increased taxes would have to cut other programs to fund vouchers.
2. Are Vouchers Appropriate for a Particular State?
States do not have identical educational needs or conditions. Arizona's voucher
plan, adopted in 1998, envisions a public education system where students can choose
from "voucher-redeeming public schools, voucher-redeeming private or parochial ones,
quasi-public charter schools, quasi-private charter schools and home learning. '
Currently, Arizona students can choose to spend their voucher money at a public
charter school or a traditional public school.' Almost five percent of the students
are able to attend charter schools because "Arizona has a quarter of all the charter
schools in the country."'
However, the impact of vouchers in many states is much more limited because there
are so few private or public school alternatives. If sectarian schools are excluded for
federal or state constitutional reasons, the choices are even fewer. One reason the New
397. See id.
398. See Miller, supra note 12, at 27.
399. See id.
400. See id.
401. See Witte, supra note 24, at 20.
402. See Miller, supra note 12, at 16.
403. Sorting Out School Choice, ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 1999, at 33, 34.
404. See id.
405. Id.
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Mexico legislature defeated vouchers was that no private schools existed where most
of the targeted poor children lived. In Florida, eight hundred students were eligible
in 1999 for vouchers, but there were only fifty-nine slots in eighteen eligible private
schools for the ninety-one students who applied for vouchers.
Problems in Oklahoma are representative of the problems facing voucher programs
in many states. Oklahoma educational and demographic conditions more closely
resemble New Mexico and Florida than Arizona. Statistics, available only for
accredited private schools, show private schooling has been growing in Oklahoma.
However, most students still attend public school.' In Moore, Oklahoma, in the fall
of 1999, there were 18,010 public school students and 355 students in three private
schools. Norman, Oklahoma, had 12,500 students in public school and 1078 in
four private schools.4 All the private schools in both cities were sectarian"
The Moore and Norman private school choices reflect those across the state. For
1998-99, the Oklahoma Department of Education lists seventy state-accredited
elementary and secondary private schools.412 Four schools are identified as "indepen-
dent," but two of those are church-related! 3 Three other schools have nonsectarian
names.41 4 Thus, at least sixty-five (93%) of the seventy private accredited schools
in Oklahoma for 1998-99 are sectarian. In addition, 46% of the sixty-one schools are
in Oklahoma City or Tulsa, 64% in the greater Oklahoma City and Tulsa areas!4 S
Unless new public charter schools or private nonsectarian schools expand the choices
available, a voucher program without sectarian schools would provide only the illusion
of choice. It is likely tliat rural students would still have only public schools available.
The current situation of limited nonpublic school choices outside of Oklahoma City
and Tulsa points to another practical problem for a voucher program in Oklahoma:
most of the "low performing" schools are outside of Oklahoma City and Tulsa. After
the passage of the education reform bill (House Bill 1017) in 1991, the state required
schools to test students. A school was listed as "low performing" if the students
scored at or below Oklahoma's twenty-fifth percentile. A school listed as "low
performing" for three consecutive years would be reclassified as "high-challenged."
416
If a school stayed on the "high challenged" list for five years, the state could take
over, fine, or even close the school. As of 1998, the state had closed two schools
406. See Hirsh & Samuelson, supra note 57, at 16.
407. See id.
408. See Veronica Jackson & Karen Johnston, Private Schooling on the Rise, NORMAN TRANSCRIPr,
Oct. 3, 1999, at Al.
409. See Could Public Schools Handle the Students if Private Schools Should Close?, NORMAN
TRANCRIPr, Oct. 3, 1999, at A3.
410. See id,
411. See id
412. See 1998-99 Oklahoma Accredited Nonpublic Schools (visited Oct. 24, 1999)
<http'J/sde.state.ok.us/acrob/eddir/private.pd f>.
413. See Advertisement, Oklahoma's Episcopal Schools, OKLAHOMA TODAY, MarApr. 2000, at 30.
414. See 1998-99 Oklahoma Accredited Nonpublic Schools, supra note 412.
415. See id. Calculations are by the author.
416. Ginnie Graham, "At Risk" List Takes a Holiday, TULSA WORLD, July 7, 1999, at 3.
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(Alluwe and Langston)4 " and had taken control of two others (Dahlonegah and Oaks
Mission)! 1
In 1999, there were fifty schools on the "low performing" list. Ten of those were
in Tulsa and six in Oklahoma City, a total of one third of all schools on the list."9
That means two-thirds of low performing schools are outside of the areas where there
are many other schools - public or private - from which to choose. Three
schools - one in Muskogee, one in Tillman, and one in Tulsa - were on the list for
the third consecutive year, but none in Oklahoma City had been on the list the year
before.4 In one sense, the lists have been successful: few schools stay on these lists
for three or more years. Many use tutoring programs or curriculum changes to
improve quickly.42'
However, the lists have generated a lot of controversy. Some critics said the low
performance was the fault of the school, but defenders of the schools noted that most
"low-performance" schools were in areas of high poverty or high minority enrollment
or high mobility and were reflecting community problems' While some schools
were still able to respond and improve test performance, others got in trouble for
exempting students from the tests or altering test results.4 In 1995, the high schools
shifted from the standardized test to state curriculum tests and thus became exempt
from the listing requirements. In 1999, the legislature required the Department of
Education to develop another method for measuring student performance for the
elementary and middle schools, so the lists may be temporarily on hold.4 Although
the Wisconsin, Ohio, and Florida voucher systems focus on students at low performing
schools, until Oklahoma establishes a consistent measure of low performance,4" that
approach to vouchers will not work.
3. Do Vouchers Satisfy State Constitutional Requirements?
The third major consideration for any state contemplating a voucher program is the
issue of constitutionality. Until the U.S. Supreme Court settles the First Amendment
voucher issue, passing a voucher program is simply an invitation to one or more
lawsuits. Even if the Court finds no federal constitutional violation, some state
constitutions still pose a potential problem for vouchers.
An analysis of Oklahoma law illustrates some of these problems. The Oklahoma
Constitution, together with those of Michigan, Florida, Georgia, Montana, and New
417. See Bobby Ross, Jr., School Test Ranks Show Improvement But Low-Performing Schools Triple
Over Last Year in City, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June 13, 1998, at 1.
418. See Graham, supra note 416.
419. See Diane Plumberg, 50 State Schools Listed Among Low Performers, DAILY OKLAHOMAN,
June 30, 1999, at Al.
420. See id. In Oklahoma City, three of the six had been on earlier lists, and the seven from the
previous year had improved and dropped off the list. See id.
421. See Graham, supra note 416.
422. Id.
423. See id.
424. See id.
425. See Plumberg, supra note 419, at 3. Schools cannot use standardized tests until 2002. See id.
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York,4" imposes some of the more rigid restrictions on aid to sectarian schools. In
addition to a state constitutional provision against such aid, Oklahoma also has case
law and Attorney General's opinions against aid to sectarian schools.4
Since 1907, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has decided three cases applying article
II, section 54 to the issue of state aid to sectarian elementary and secondary schools.
In Oklahoma Railway Co. v. Saint Joseph's School,4" the court held that a city
franchise contract that requires a tram line to provide half fare rides for all school-
children, whether they are public or parochial school students, does not violate article
II, section 5. In its reasoning, the court noted that children have a right to attend
private school and that the reduced fares help promote education of children. In
addition, the court stressed that the city could not discriminate in a contract.4'
Looking only at this 1912 case, a court could conclude that article II, section 5 does
allow indirect aid to benefit students. However, Gurney v. Ferguson43 ' and Board
of Education of Independent School District No. 52 v. Antone,4' the other two cases
on the transportation of parochial school students, find article I, section 5 bars state
aid for the transportation of such students. The Gurney court distinguished Oklahoma
Railway for two reasons. First, public school buses involve spending public money,
but the regulation of the Oklahoma Railway Company did not involve public money.
Second, Oklahoma Railway was about the railway's contract and franchise agreement
with the city, not state involvement in a sectarian institution.
In Gurney, the court ruled that a state law requiring public school buses to transport
both public school students and parochial school students who lived on or near the
regular public school bus routes does violate article II, section 54' The Gurney
426. See Kemerer, supra note 3, at 5. Twelve other states have only slightly less restrictive
provisions. See id. at 6.
427. See id. at 39-40 tbl.l.
428. See supra note 5 and accompanying text for the constitutional language.
429. 127 P. 1087, 1089 (Okla. 1912). However, in its earliest article 11, section 5 decision, Cornell
v. Gray, 127 P. 417, 421 (Okla. 1912), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Board of Regents of
A. and M. College (now O.S.U.) could not require students to pay fees that in part went to support
sectarian student organizations. The Cornell court reasoned that, since article II, section 5 meant that the
legislature could not appropriate money for such a purpose or authorize the Board of Regents to spend
money for such a purpose, the Board could not require students to pay fees for such a purpose. See id.
Furthermore, "[s)aid section 5 of article 2 is self-executing, and requires no act of the Legislature to
become operative, but by itself controls all legislation upon the subject of appropriating money or other
property for such purposes." Id In addition, the Cornell court noted that article 11, section 5 was rooted
in the Jeffersonian tradition of the 1786 Virginia law titled "An act for establishing religious freedom"
and reflected similar provisions in other state constitutions. See id. In Rosenburger v. University of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment does not prohibit
allocating student fees to a student religious group which was only one of many student groups receiving
money. However, that does not mean the Oklahoma Supreme Court would necessarily change its
interpretation in Cornell v. Gray.
430. See Oklahoma Ry. Co., 127 P. at 1088.
431. 122 P.2d 1002 (Okla. 1941).
432. 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963).
433. Gurney, 122 P.2d at 1004.
434. See id.
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court reasoned that schools that are "owned and controlled by a church" and that teach
the beliefs of the church to the students are "sectarian institutions."'35 Therefore,
article I, section 5's ban on the use of public money to aid "sectarian institutions"
applies to sectarian schools.
The Gurney court rejected the argument that the aid went to the children and not
to the schools for three reasons. First, the child benefit argument would apply just as
well to the construction of buildings and to salaries of teachers, but article II, section
5 clearly forbids such expenditures!' Second, the legislative justification of public
school buses is that buses aid public education. The court reasoned that if the buses
aid public schools, then the buses also aid private sectarian schools, which clearly
violates article II, section 5' Third, the court reasoned that a small amount of aid
would lead the sectarian schools to ask for more aid, and soon the state would be
regulating and then controlling the schools, which was not appropriate.4
The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Gurney before the U.S. Supreme Court held
in Everson that the Frst Amendment, as applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, did not prohibit state transportation of parochial school
students. However, in Antone, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Everson does
not control application of state constitutional provisions and that an Oklahoma school
district policy of transporting parochial school students in public school buses does
violate article IL section 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution.mI The 1963 Antone court
reaffirmed the Gurney decision and its reasoning against the child benefit ar-
gument.
In addition, the Antone court specifically rejected the argument that "providing for
the education of all children ... and affording facilities therefor ... should not be
measured by whether.. . [the money] aids any particular sectarian institution.., but
whether the purpose is the general welfare." The court stated that, even if
transporting parochial school students does promote public welfare, that does not alter
the fact that article HI, section 5 "prohibits the use of public money or property for
sectarian or public schools."' The court concluded that: "[tlhe law leaves to every
man the right to . . . provide for the religious instruction and training of his
children .... When he chooses ... educational facilities which combine secular and
religious instruction, he is faced with the necessity of assuming the financial burden
which that choice entails.""s
435. Id. at 1003.
436. Id.
437. See idL at 1004.
438. See id.
439. See id at 1004-05.
440. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
441. See Board of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 52 v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911, 912 (Okla. 1963).
442. See id at 914.
443. Id. at 913.
444. Id.
445. Id. For a discussion of the child benefit and public welfare positions in the Gurney and Antone
courts, see Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Constitutionality, Under State Constitutional Provision
Forbidding Financial Aid to Religious Sects, of Public Provision of Schoolbus Service for Private School
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Gurney and Antone are strong statements against the use of public monies to aid
sectarian schools. In both Gurney and Antone, the aid was indirect aid that went to
the children, not direct aid to a sectarian school. Even if the U.S. Supreme Court were
to hold that the First Amendment does not forbid the use of educational vouchers to
attend sectarian schools, an Oklahoma court following Gurney and Antone would
likely rule that such vouchers violate article 11, section 5 of the Oklahoma
Constitution.
In situations, however, that do not involve state aid to sectarian elementary and
secondary schools, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has ruled that article Il, section 5
does not forbid all state involvement with sectarian institutions. For example, in Sharp
v. Guthrie,' the court held that a city does not violate article II, section 5 by selling
public land to a sectarian institution for adequate consideration. 7 The court
reaffirmed Sharp in 1989 in Burkhardt v. Enid.'
The Burkhardt court held that a city could purchase a campus from a church-related
college and lease it back to the same college at below market rate without violating
article H, section 5.' The court gave two reasons for this conclusion. First, the
college provided adequate non-monetary consideration to the community in the form
of services, reduced-cost educational opportunities for citizens, and economic
development support for the city.4 Second, the college was not a sectarian
institution because it was not controlled by the church, did not require students to
learn the tenets of the church, had severed its ties with the graduate seminary, had
excluded the chapel from the sale, and had agreed to accounting procedures to ensure
no public monies were spent on religious activities.45' Therefore, the court ruled that:
"Article 2, section 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution constitutes a bonafide, separate,
adequate, and independent ground upon which we rest our decision that the plan does
not benefit a sectarian institution.""'
An Oklahoma court examining a voucher program in light of the Sharp and
Burkhardt decisions might decide that a participating sectarian school was providing
adequate consideration in return for any public monies received. However, the
Burkhardt court strongly emphasizes the nonsectarian nature of the college. Therefore,
a court applying Burkhardt to a voucher program may be more likely to conclude that
only nonsectarian private schools could participate without violating article II, section
5 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
Pupils, 41 A.L.R.3D 344,356,362 (1972). Spivey finds courts in most states with similar constitutional
provisions conclude that transportation of parochial school students on public school buses does violate
the state constitution. See id. at 366.
446. 152 P. 403 (Okla. 1915).
447. See id at 408.
448. 771 P.2d 608 (Okla. 1989).
449. See id. at 612.
450. See id.
451. See i. at 612-13.
452. Id. at 613.
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In addition to these cases, there are others that allow some public money to go to
sectarian institutions. For example, in Murrow Indian Orphans Home v. Childers,"n
the Oklahoma Supreme Court also concluded that it was not a violation of article II,
section 5, for the Oklahoma legislature to authorize paying a sectarian institution for
its expenses in caring for deprived and dependent orphans. In Murrow, the state
had contracted with the Home for the care and education of deprived children but was
refusing to pay the for services rendered because the Baptist Church ran the Home. "
In Murrow, the court determined that Gurney did not control because Gurney did
not, like Murrow, involve a contract of payment for service.4 The Murrow court
noted that the state knew this was a Baptist institution when it made the contract and
that the state could not, after receiving the services, refuse to pay the bills.4" While
one might read Murrow to suggest that Oklahoma could spend through contract what
it could not spend directly, the Antone court limited Murrow by noting that the state
was not supporting the Home, but simply paying for services rendered. "
Two Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions do allow limited state aid to religion on
the grounds that no sectarian institution is involved. In Meyer v. Oklahoma City,"'
the court determined that article I, section 5 does not prohibit Oklahoma City from
maintaining a cross on the state fairgrounds primarily because the cross is in a
"commercial atmosphere that obscures whatever suggestions may emanate from its
silent form, ... and vitiate[s] any . . . support for any sect."' In addition, the
Meyer court noted that the purpose of the constitutional provision was "to prevent
sectarian bodies from making raids upon the public treasury,"' and that the
maintenance costs here would be slight.' In contrast, in State v. Williamson,' the
court approved the use of trust funds to build a chapel at a state school because "we
are a Christian Nation and a Christian State." The court held that none of the
precedents suggested that building a chapel would violate article II, section 5 or the
First Amendment. However, in Meyer, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that
453. 171 P.2d 600 (Okla. 1946).
454. See id. at 603.
455. See id. at 601.
456. See id. at 602.
457. See id.; see also C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Public Payment of Tuition, Scholarship, or the like,
as Respects Sectarian Schools, 81 A.L.R.2D 1309, 1315 (1961) (noting that, in such contracts, states
consistently authorize payments so long as no money is taken from public schools and the contract
reflects nonsectarian market price); Witte, supra note 24, at 102 (noting that before and after vouchers
were adopted, Milwaukee Public Schools had contracts with private schools to service specific student
needs).
458. Board of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 52 v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911, 913 (Okla. 1963).
459. 496 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1972).
460. Id. at 793.
461. Id. at 791.
462. See id.
463. 347 P.2d 204 (Okla. 1959).
464. Id at 207-08.
465. See id. at 206.
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the chapel services were non-sectarian, non-denominational, not required and that the
chapel served as a sort of general assembly hall.'
Three themes emerge from these article II, section 5 cases. First, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has said that the Oklahoma Constitution means what it says: public
money cannot be appropriated to provide direct or indirect aid to a sectarian
institution. Second, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has allowed aid when the court has
determined the institution or practice is not sectarian. Third, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has permitted some state contracts that involve sectarian institutions when there
is no state appropriation of money or when the state has contracted for specific
services.
Oklahoma courts applying these decisions to a voucher program that included
sectarian schools might conclude that article I, section 5 does not forbid a state
contract with a sectarian institution for a specific service (such as teaching calculus
or German) that the public schools could not provide. However, it is highly unlikely
that this contract argument could be extended to cover a complete educational program
that took money from public schools and transferred it to sectarian institutions. It is
much more likely that the Oklahoma courts would find that neither the child benefit
nor the public welfare arguments can be used to justify direct or indirect aid to
sectarian schools. Since nearly all private schools in Oklahoma are sectarian, a
voucher program that excluded these schools would be not expand student choice
significantly. But to permit any significant aid to sectarian schools, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court would have to overturn Gurney and Antone.
Thus, unless the Oklahoma Constitution or the interpretation of the Oklahoma
Constitution changes, both the U.S. and the Oklahoma Constitutions could be used to
challenge a voucher program in Oklahoma. While "[s]tate judges often take an
independent mind in interpreting state constitutional provisions, and what appears to
be restrictive may turn out to be permissive,"' current Oklahoma law is against the
use of vouchers in sectarian schools. Continuing the ban on aid to sectarian schools
would be "more attuned to the differences in language between the federal and state
constitutions and to the differing historical experiences underlying their adoption. '
Therefore, even state officials who favor vouchers need to consider their choices
carefully. Even if officials sift through the contradictory research results and decide
that vouchers do improve education of students, there are other considerations. Intense
466. See Meyer, 496 P.2d at 792.
467. There is little evidence that the 2000 Oklahoma legislature wants such a change. The
Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act, which went into effect November 1, 2000, specifically states:
Nothing in the act shall be construed to... [a]ffect, interpret, or in any way address those
portions of Article 1, Section 2, and Article 2, Section 5, of the Constitution of the State
of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act, or the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States that prohibit laws respecting the establishment of
religion.
51 OKLA. STAT. § 255.A.3 (Supp. 2000). By also stating that "[t]his provision does not in and of itself
require vouchers," id. § 255.B, the Act discourages attempts to use the Act in court to promote voucher
programs.
468. Kemerer, supra note 3, at 15.
469. Tarr, supra note 2, at 98.
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interest group involvement, partisan rhetoric, and a divided public all point to political
costs for approving or opposing vouchers. Voucher programs are potentially
expensive. If a state lacks the alternative schools to provide choices, vouchers will not
have much impact. Finally, a voucher plan that tries to expand choices by including
sectarian schools invites lawsuits.
B. Choices for Oklahoma and Other States
Given these considerations, what are the choices for Oklahoma and other states?
One possibility is the choice Florida made in 1999: adopt a state-wide program
similar to those in Milwaukee and Cleveland.' This. approach would be divisive and
expensive unless there is solid evidence that vouchers are constitutional and effective.
Even if there is enough popular support for the program, it would be wise to wait until
the Supreme Court rules on the issue.
In addition, one of the benefits of federalism is that states can experiment with ideas
to see if they work. Currently, the evidence from Cleveland and Milwaukee does not
conclusively show whether vouchers improve student learning. If the Cleveland,
Milwaukee, and Florida programs survive the constitutional and political tests ahead,
those programs should begin to generate some useful data on the impact of vouchers
in the future.47 By then, the U.S. Supreme Court may have accepted and decided
Zelman or another voucher case. Then, policy-makers in Oklahoma and other states
will be able to approach the issue of vouchers with more realistic expectations of costs
and outcomes. However, Oklahoma also needs to consider whether the state has the
tax base and the educational infrastructure needed to expand school choice. Even if
vouchers work in more urban states, they may not be the best choice for Oklahoma.
A second choice for the states is to adopt more limited and narrowly targeted
voucher programs. These are less expensive, less divisive, and Witters and Zobrest
imply such programs are more likely to receive U.S. Supreme Court approval. For
example, Governor Frank Keating has suggested vouchers for special education
students and disruptive students as well as for students in poorly performing
schools.4 The Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Murrow may indicate that
such a program might even work with sectarian schools. However, private schools
usually don't want disruptive students' n and often lack special education programs.
If states choose targeted vouchers, officials also need to be aware of the tendency of
small, targeted programs to grow into universal entitlements.474
470. See Stanley M. Elam, Floridas Voucher Program: Legislating What Can't Be Done by
Referendum, Pin DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 1999, at 81, 81-86 (providing details of the Florida plan and
controversies over that plan).
471. See Metcalf & Tait; supra note 35, at 73-74.
472. See Ross, supra note 15, at 1.
473. See Hirsh & Samuelson, supra note 57 (noting that parents choose private schools in part
because they feel such schools are safer).
474. See supra notes 386-88 and accompanying text. But see Metcalf & Tait, supra note 35, at 74
(suggesting businesses, bureaucracies, and individuals committed to and dependent on public schools
make universal vouchers unlikely, even if cost is not a bar).
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The third approach is for state policy-makers to take a different approach to
improving public schools. School choice is popular,475 but vouchers are not the only
way to provide school choice. School choice programs so far have included:
alternative schools, magnet schools, charter schools, special mentoring or tutoring
centers, public state boarding schools for the gifted and talented, expanding internet
access for rural schools, open enrollment between and within school districts, tax
credits or deductions for part or all of private school tuition, special programs within
a single school, and public school contracts with private schools. Only a few of these
non-voucher choice programs have faced legal challenges; and Mueller476 and
Kotternan v. Killian477 suggest that tax deductions or tax credits that encourage
private voucher programs are also unlikely to have constitutional problems!'
This seems a better approach for Oklahoma, where voucher programs, even if they
are constitutional, will only increase student choices marginally in larger urban areas.
Many of Oklahoma's poorly performing schools are in small towns and rural areas.
Policy-makers need to use approaches that are flexible enough to address concerns
throughout the state.
VIII. Conclusion
Voucher programs may or may not be constitutional. In Zelman, the district court
decided vouchers violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Now that
the Sixth Circuit has affirmed the district court, the U.S. Supreme Court can, if it
chooses, use Zelman to provide some guidance to the states on this issue.
However, until the Supreme Court decides the issue, states still have an implicit or
explicit (depending on the state constitution) responsibility to provide educational
opportunities to their citizens. States need to determine which programs, given the
uncertain legal climate, have a realistic chance of being both constitutional in the state
and useful in addressing state educational problems.
In Oklahoma, vouchers are not an appropriate solution to educational problems. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court is not likely to find vouchers constitutional. Even if there
were clear evidence that vouchers improve student performance, at this time Oklahoma
does not have a satisfactory method of rating which schools are performing poorly or
performing well. Even if Oklahoma included sectarian schools in a voucher plan, the
state would still lack the private or public schools needed to provide meaningful
choices for Oklahoma children outside the state's urban areas.
Catharine V. Ewing
475. See Metcalf & Tait, supra note 35, at 67.
476. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
477. 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999).
478. See Hirsh & Samuelson, supra note 57, at 16 (noting that Minnesota, Iowa, Arizona, and
Illinois offer tax credits or deductions). These programs have survived court challenges in part because
even parents of public school students can take deductions for books and fees. In addition, the limits on
the deductions and tax credits mean these programs are less of a threat to public school funding. See iL;
see also supra notes 320-23 and accompanying text (reporting public opinion supporting tax credits).
20001
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol53/iss3/4
